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THE FORCE OF LAW: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION*
by Michael Ratner * * and David Cole***
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the Vietnam War, federal courts refused to adjudicate
challenges to presidential war-making. The constitutional mandate
that Congress initiate war thus went unenforced for the duration of our
longest and most unpopular war. In response to this constitutional cri-
sis, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973. The Resolu-
tion establishes a procedural mechanism to implement the
constitutional allocation of war powers. But the Resolution can redress
the constitutional imbalance only if it is given the force of law. Recent
presidents have been as reluctant to honor the War Powers Resolution
as earlier presidents had been to follow the war powers clause. If Con-
gress is to regain its rightful war powers, then, judicial review of presi-
dential war-making is required. The present constitutional crisis can
be resolved, but only with the active participation of a heretofore reluc-
tant judiciary.
When the Framers assigned the power to "declare war and grant
letters of marque and reprisal"' to Congress, they committed a revolu-
tionary act. The grant of war powers to a legislative rather than execu-
tive body was unprecedented in the annals of history.' Yet it was an
issue about which there was little dispute; the record of the Convention
* Copyright, 1984 Michael Ratner and David Cole. The authors express their
gratitude for research and editing assistance to Gail L. Pendleton, J.D., New York
University Law School, 1985.
** B.A., Brandeis University, 1966; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1970; Attorney, Center
of Constitutional Rights.
*** B.A., Yale University, 1980; J.D., Yale Law School, 1984.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 11.
2. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 480-81 (1928). Article 9 of the
Articles of Confederation, passed in 1781, gave the "sole and exclusive right and the power
of determining war and peace" to a national legislative body. E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED
WAR (1982). The Constitution cannot be viewed as a wholly separate document from the
Articles of Confederation; they are, in a sense, two steps in the constitutive act of our nation.
The Articles' war powers grant was effectively nullified by leaving to the states the power to
tax and supply funds to the Confederation's treasury and by requiring the assent of nine
states to support any decision to go to war. Id at 25-26.
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accords only "one page out of. . .1,273" to the debate over the war
powers clause.3 The mere mention of executive-initiated wars led one
delegate, Mr. Gerry, to declare that he "never expected to hear, in a
republic, a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."
4
The Framers considered congressional control of the power to go to
war essential to a republican form of government.5
Since 1950, we have witnessed a reversal in the constitutional
scheme. The war powers, clearly vested in Congress by the Framers,
have come under de facto presidential control. While scholars differ as
to the sources, causes, and historical details of this constitutional altera-
tion, very few deny that the constitutional scheme has been radically
frustrated.6
The judiciary has neither attempted to redress nor even recognized
this problem. By dismissing in the name of "judicial restraint" chal-
lenges to presidential usurpation of the war powers, the courts have
ignored their institutional role. They are to assure that fundamental
alterations in the structure of government occur only through the con-
stitutional process of amendment, and not through sheer exercises of
power. They are "to say what the law is." 7 When that law-particu-
larly the preeminent law embodied in the Constitution-is manifestly
disregarded, they are to enforce its dictates. The notion of a govern-
ment of laws presupposes that laws can restrict and control the power
of those within government. When power prevails over law, the latter's
dependence on the former is uncovered, and all that is left to the judici-
ary is empty-handed self-restraint.
The de facto presidential war power undermines both the founda-
tion of our republican form of government and the limitations imposed
by a written constitution.' If the Framer's premises were correct, it is
3. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE
Li. 672, 675 (1972).
4. RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 318 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
5. Congressional responsibility for the initiation of war was also considered important
for other reasons. The Framers believed that Congress would be less likely to involve the
country in needless and dangerous wars than would a single man. The Framers also consid-
ered that because war could prove such a burden on the citizenry, the nation should only go
to war in instances where the most representative body decided to do so. Thus, congres-
sional war powers were to act both as a damper on dangerous (and possibly improper) mili-
tary ambitions, and as an assurance that when the government went to war, it was acting in
accordance with the people's will.
6. See, e.g., E. KEYNES, supra note 2; Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional
Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1969).
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 48, 70 (1803).
8. See Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. L.
REv. 65, 66 (1977) ("[T]he manner of the exercise of the war powers determines not only the
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quite likely to lead the nation into unwarranted and dangerous military
conflicts. Judicial disregard of regular violations of this central provi-
sion of our Constitution sanctions illegal presidential actions. The ar-
rogation of presidential war powers and the refusal of the courts to act
have created a constitutional crisis.
This article argues that the crisis can be resolved, and that, indeed,
the first and most difficult steps to its resolution have already been
taken. In 1973, in the shadow of the Vietnam War, Congress passed
the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution establishes procedures for
early congressional action when United States Armed Forces are intro-
duced into hostilities. Its procedures, if followed, would go far toward
restoring the constitutional balance. Congress intended it to do so. But
the efficacy of those procedures depends largely on the Resolution's
status as enforceable law, and that depends on the possibility of judicial
action. Absent judicial enforcement, the War Powers Resolution loses
the force of law and becomes merely a rallying cry for Congress. Ab-
sent judicial enforcement, the Resolution's purpose is all too easily
frustrated by presidential action. Absent judicial enforcement, the War
Powers Resolution does no more than the war powers clause itself did
to maintain Congress' prerogative over war in the face of presidential
usurpation.
A responsible judiciary, therefore, must enforce the War Powers
Resolution. The Resolution, by defining situations requiring affirma-
tive congressional approval, by clarifying what constitutes congres-
sional approval, and by establishing a procedure for executive-
legislative collaboration, provides a role for judicially appropriate re-
lief. The War Powers Resolution makes adjudication possible. The
translation of that possibility into reality requires judicial courage-the
courage to demand that our government be conducted according to the
Constitution, and that the Executive abide by the law.
Part II of this article examines the origins and early history of the
war powers clause. That history makes clear: (1) that the Framers in-
tended Congress to exercise control over the decision to go to war; and
(2) that Presidents since 1900 have increasingly violated the spirit of the
war powers clause. Part III argues that during the Vietnam War the
gap between the Constitution and presidential practice reached crisis
proportion, as presidents regularly escalated the war, Congress was un-
able to exert any effective control, and the judiciary repeatedly refused
to challenge an unconstitutional status quo.
nation's freedom from external danger, but also the respect which the national government has
for law andfor constitutional limitations on the exercise ofpower.") (emphasis added).
1984]
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Part IV outlines Congress' response, the War Powers Resolution.
Part V, which details presidential noncompliance with the Resolution
since 1973, demonstrates the impotence of a Congress standing alone
against Presidents determined to evade constitutional and statutory
limits.
Part VI argues, therefore, that if the War Powers Resolution is to
have its intended effect, and if the constitutional scheme is to be pro-
tected, the War Powers Resolution requires judicial enforcement.
Neither broad nor specific "political question" concerns justify judicial
abdication, particularly where to abdicate is to render both the clause
and the Resolution meaningless. Finally, the article concludes with a
case study of the only judicial challenge to date to violations of the War
Powers Resolution, Crockett v. Reagan. 9 That case, like many of the
later Vietnam cases, affirms thepossibility of judicial enforcement but
refrains from taking the final necessary step to action.
II. THE WAR POWERS CLAUSE: ITS ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY
Traditional interpretations of the proper allocation of war powers
have looked to both the constitutional framework set in place in 1787
and the subsequent historical development and practice.10 What makes
this task particularly difficult is that the origins and end-state are at
virtually antithetical poles. Under the Constitution, Congress must de-
clare or authorize any war effort before it is commenced. Under pres-
ent day practice, however, Presidents regularly take the initiative in
war unilaterally, asserting that while congressional approval would be
appreciated, it is not necessary."
This radical disjuncture in law and practical reality is due to a
variety of historical and institutional factors. Presidential usurpation
of the war powers can be traced to changes in United States foreign
policy, congressional abdication of responsibility, institutional charac-
teristics of the legislative and executive branches, as well as to the over-
reaching of individual presidents. None of these factors, however,
9. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aed, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
10. See, e.g., W.T. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: VHo
HOLDS THE ARRows AND OLIVE BRANCH? (1981); Reveley, supra note 6; Reveley, Book
Review, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1983). Reveley assumes throughout that the immediate
prospect of judicial involvement in resolving this problem is dim. This assumption, while it
unfortunately may be accurate, underlies Reveley's emphasis on the importance of practice.
In political give-and-take, practice looms large; in law, there is a strong presumption that
illegal actions, no matter how oft-repeated, do not legitimate the action. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 at n.13 (1983).
11. See infra notes 110-59 and accompanying text.
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provide compelling reasons for what is essentially a de facto constitu-
tional amendment.
A significant portion of the blame for the disjuncture must be
borne by the judiciary.12 Its reluctance to enforce the mandates of the
written Constitution, particularly during the longest undeclared war in
our history, has effectively sanctioned unconstitutional presidential ac-
tion and rendered the constitutional limits on war powers bankrupt. It
is because the judiciary repeatedly refused to play a role in the articula-
tion of constitutional standards during the Vietnam War that the law
provided no protection.'3 Without law, there is only politics; the care-
fully crafted checks and balances of the Constitution fall prey to the
institution that acts first and speaks later: the Presidency.
A. The War Powers Clause-Its Textual Meaning
As a matter of textual analysis, the Constitution could not be
clearer regarding allocation of war powers: Congress is given the
power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, raise, sup-
port and regulate the armed forces, organize and arm the militia, and
exercise control over all "needful" military arsenals and encamp-
ments.'" The President, on the other hand, is simply named Com-
mander-in-Chief, and given the power to commission officers.' 5 As
Commander-in-Chief, his authority extends to the day-to-day conduct
of wars authorized or declared by Congress; in Hamilton's words, he is
12. Where the judiciary exercises its responsibility to interpret and apply the written
laws, the law more closely coincides with reality, even where that reality requires change.
Compare, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857) with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Compare Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The notions
of due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and obscenity all change with the times, but
this does not preclude the application of legal standards to complaints arising under the first,
fifth, eighth or fourteenth amendments. The law, particularly constitutional law, is an
evolving creature, but unless it is applied, it will lose touch with changing reality, and lose its
force as a guiding and power-limiting tool.
13. Defenders of judicial restraint will point out that Vietnam was not the first time a
presidential war was commenced and continued without the approval of Congress, and with
express reliance on "inherent" presidential power. President Truman made this claim to
justify the Korean War. But, for whatever reason, no litigation was brought to challenge
that war, while dozens of cases challenged the legality of the Vietnam War. It may be that
President Truman's action and Congress' acquiescence is in part to blame for the gap be-
tween law and practice. But the very existence of persistent litigation during the Vietnam
War suggests that it was then, not during the Korean War, that the disjuncture reached
constitutional crisis proportions. The consistent refusal of the courts to adjudicate the Viet-
nam War cases offered telling evidence of the poverty of law.
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
1984]
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the "first General and Admiral," but has no power to initiate wars or
unilaterally to call up the armed forces. 16 Thus, the plain language of
the Constitution clearly vests the bulk of the war power in Congress,
while limiting the President to the conduct of wars once approved.
The history of the drafting confirms this plain meaning. The
Framers wrote in a revolutionary period. Their rebellion had been
directed in large part at the excesses of British monarchy, and they
were wary of investing the Executive with significant powers. Under
the Articles of Confederation, all national powers had been vested in
Congress; "Executive there was none, beyond the committees which the
congress might establish to work under its own direction . . .,,"
Under the Constitution, too, the Executive has few enumerated
powers. 18
The war power, considered one of the most dangerous of sovereign
powers, was assigned almost exclusively to Congress. As a young and
weak nation, the United States had a strong self-interest in maintaining
peace and neutrality. 9 The Framers felt that Congress would be less
likely to get the country involved in wars than the President, who might
be tempted to enter conflicts for self-aggrandizement. Requiring the
affirmative joint action of both Houses would make going to war diffi-
cult; as George Mason stated, he was "for clogging rather than facilitat-
ing war, [but] for facilitating peace."20 War should be difficult to
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
17. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1913); see also Articles of
Confederation, id, at 211-24. The infirmity of the Articles was largely attributed to the
weakness of the national government vis-a-vis the states. 2 THE MADISON PAPERS 692
(1840); Note, The War-Making Powers: he Intentions ofthe Framers in the Light of Parlia-
mentary History, 50 B.U.L. REv. 5, 10-11 (Special Issue 1970). The Constitution granted
greatly increased power to the national government, but simultaneously established a system
of checks and balances to restrain that power. The Framers were careful, however, not to
grant many powers to the Executive, for they feared the tyranny of executive prerogative.
See generally, E. KEYNES, supra note 2, at 25-30.
18. See, e.g., Professor Charles Black on executive power under the Constitution:
The upshot is that under the Constitution, as it came from the Convention, the
Presidency stood within the shadow of Congress. Without straining a single provi-
sion in the text, Congress might have made the President into a symbolic chef
d'etat. His enumerated powers are those commonly enjoyed by persons in that
position.
C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 (rev. ed. 1970); see also id at 55-58.
19. Lobel, The Rise and Decline of/he NeutralityAct: Sovereignty and Congressional War
Powers in United States Foreign Policy, HARV. INT'L L.J. I (1983).
20. Remarks of George Mason, reported in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, 314 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966) (Madison's notes, August 17). During ratifica-
tion, Framer James Wilson made a similar comment to the Pennsylvania convention:
This system will not bring us into war, it is calculated to guard against it. It will
not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such
distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at
[Vol. 17
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initiate, both because it posed dangers to the nation and because it
raised serious moral and legal issues."' Requiring bicameral affirma-
tive approval of war was also more likely to ensure that wars were only
initiated where there was broad public support.22 Finally, there may
have been some notion that because the decision to wage war is a diffi-
cult one, subject to error and entailing serious consequences, the re-
quirement of broad congressional consensus might minimize errors of
judgment.2 3
For some or all of these reasons, the Framers gave Congress virtu-
ally exclusive power to initiate war, whether declared or undeclared,
perfect or imperfect.2 4 The sole exception lies in the President's right to
large... from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing
but our national interest can draw us into war.
2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 528 (J. Elliot ed. 1888).
21. See J. ROGERS, WAR POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 34-35 (1945); Note, Con-
gress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771,
1775 (1968).
22. J. ROGERS, supra note 21, at 34-35; Note, supra note 21, at 1775.
23. As Professor Bickel eloquently stated:
There is no assurance of wisdom in Congress, and no such assurance in the presi-
dency. ... The only assurance there is lies in the process, in the duty to explain,
justify and persuade, to define the national interest by evoking it, and thus to act by
consent . . . Singly, either the President or Congress can fall into bad errors
... . So they can together, too, but that is somewhat less likely, and in any event,
together they're all we've got.
Bickel, The Needfor a War-Powers Bill, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1972, at 18. See also
Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balances-The Claim of an Unlimited Presiden-
tial War Power, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 213, 260-61 (1983).
24. The power "to grant letters of marque and reprisal" refers to the authority to initiate
an "imperfect kind of limited war, or those acts of hostility which sovereigns exercise against
each other, or, with their consent, the subjects of foreign commonwealth, that refuseth to do
justice... ." 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITICAL LAW 258
(3d ed. 1784). See also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). The Framers gave
Congress this power in order to remove any remaining doubt about the authority of Con-
gress, as opposed to the President, to authorize undeclared hostilities. See Lofgren, War-
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 692-700
(1972). Those war-making powers not within the "declare war" provision were residual in
the "grant letters of marque and reprisal" provision. See Firmage, supra note 8, at 81 n.76.
Professor Reveley has written of the powers granted to Congress by art. I, § 8, cl. 11:
The Framers' grant of authority to Congress to declare war and issue letters of
marque and reprisal almost certainly was intended to convey control over all in-
volvement of American forces in combat, whether for defensive or offensive pur-
poses, except in response to sudden attack.
Reveley, Book Review, supra note 10, at 2121.
Jefferson recognized the importance of granting Congress the authority to grant letters
of marque and reprisal:
The making of a reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing. Remonstrance and
refusal of satisfaction ought to precede; and when reprisal follows, it is considered
an act of war. . . . [I]f the case were important and ripe for that step, Congress
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repel sudden attacks on the United States.2" This exception has been
interpreted not as a grant of war powers to the President, but as a "nec-
essary concomitant" of national sovereignty and the right to self-
defense.26
Thus, under the Constitution as written and as interpreted in light
of the Framer's intent, Congress is to decide whether and when the
United States is to go to war. Once war is declared, the President is to
execute the war, just as he executes the laws. Under the procedural
framework envisioned by the Framers war could not be commenced
until Congress had first authorized or declared that it should
commence.
B. The War Powers Exercised-A Historical Overview
Presidential practice has undermined the Framers' intent. It has
been the rare exception that a war has been undertaken only after posi-
tive congressional action. In one manner or another, presidents have
regularly provoked wars-subtly or openly-and only then gone to
Congress for approval. Still, it was not until the Korean War that a
president explicitly claimed that he needed no congressional approval
whatsoever to initiate and conduct an unauthorized war. Since Tru-
man, presidents have maintained this position. Thus, outright defiance
of the written constitutional requirement that Congress initiate war is a
relatively recent phenomenon.' Earlier instances of presidential abuse
of the war power demonstrate that at least until the close of World War
II, constitutional law still imposed some constraints on executive
power.
Professor Reveley identifies three stages in "the President's pro-
must be called upon to take it; the right of reprisal being expressly lodged with
them by the Constitution, and not the Executive.
VII J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (1906) (quoting 7 JEFFERSON'S WORKS
628).
25. The one alteration noted in the constitutional grant of congressional war powers is
the substitution of "declare" for "make." The well-established reason for this change was,
according to Madison, to leave to the Executive "the power to repel sudden attacks." 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789 318-19 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966). See
also E. KEYNES, supra note 2, at 35-36; Lofgren, supra note 3, at 675; Note, supra note 21, at
1773 n.16; Reveley, supra note 6, at 1285 n.139.
26. Note, supra note 21, at 1778. The author argues that the right to self-defense, and
the need for immediate exercise of that right when the nation is under sudden attack, need
not find a basis in any specific constitutional provision or grant, for it necessarily derives
from the notion of sovereignty itself.
27. It is no accident that the incidence of lawsuits challenging the legality of United
States wars increased so dramatically shortly following President Truman's innovative and
radical "interpretation." See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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gress toward virtually complete control over the commitment of Ameri-
can troops abroad."2 The first and longest stage, comprising the
period from adoption of the Constitution to the end of the nineteenth
century, was characterized by "genuine collaboration between the
President and Congress, and [by] executive deference to legislative will
regarding the initiation of foreign conflicts."2 9 During this period of
over one hundred years, unilateral executive military action was lim-
ited to action short of war, e.g., acts to suppress piracy and counter the
American slave trade, "hot pursuit" of invaders, and neutral protection
of United States lives or property abroad where that protection was not
likely to provoke a war.
30
The second stage runs from about 1900-1941, the beginning of the
Second World War. During this period, legislative-executive collabo-
ration virtually ceased, but Congress continued to exert influence over
military foreign policy. Unilateral executive military action became
more prevalent, but Presidents always offered an excuse or rationale;
never did they assert that they had inherent war power.3'
28. Reveley, supra note 6, at 1257-65. Similar lines are drawn by many legal historians
of the war powers clause. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL
COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-18 (1967) (hereinafter NATIONAL
COMMITMENTS REPORT); Freidman, supra note 23, at 228-37; Note, supra note 21, at 1788-
91.
29. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 9; Reveley, supra note 6, at
1257. During this period, President Adams led a limited naval war against France, in com-
plete compliance with congressional statutes. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra
note 28, at 9; Reveley, supra note 6, at 1259 n.42. See also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37
(1800). Jefferson, responding to attacks on United States ships by Bombay Pirates off the
coast of Tripoli, refused to permit any offensive action by naval ships until he received
congressional authorization. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 10. In-
deed, up to the 1890s, "only in the case of Texas and the Mexican War did the executive
[President Polk] encroach upon the legislature's constitutional prerogative" with respect to
war powers. R. LEOPOLD, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 99 (1962). (Two
years later, the House censured Polk.)
30. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 11-12. This first period in-
cluded the Civil War, in which President Lincoln exercised broad unilateral emergency
power, but that action (1) did not involve use of force against foreign countries, and (2) was
characterized by the Supreme Court as a response to sudden attack on the nation. See The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
3 1. Thus, for example, widespread military involvements in the affairs of Caribbean and
Central American governments, particularly by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and
Wilson, were labeled as "neutral interpositions," ostensibly limited to the protection of
United States lives and property. In fact, a 1934 State Department report went to great
lengths to distinguish between neutral interposition, which the executive could unilaterally
order, and intervention-interference with the political concerns of another state-which
required congressional authorization. United States Dep't of State, Right to Protect Citizens
in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces, 24-34, 40, 44, 48 (3d rev. ed. 1934) (Memorandum of
the Solicitor). An argument sometimes made, but which should rightfully be put to rest,
suggests that because our involvement in Latin America during this period was unlikely to
provoke major conflicts (because of United States strength and the opposition's weakness),
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The post-World War II situation marks a virtually complete
breakdown in the collaboration and interaction of the President and
Congress on questions of war-making. The fear provoked by the Cold
War and possible congressional embarrassment over its past isolation-
ism in the face of Nazism gave the President a free hand in using mili-
tary force abroad.32 "The decisions to employ arms off Formosa, in
Korea, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam were
essentially the President's, as were the policies that led Washington to
feel that force was essential.
33
The critical turning point in this history came when President Tru-
man, in the summer of 1950, unilaterally committed 83,000 troops to
fight North Korean forces. Unlike previous presidents, President Tru-
man neither sought after-the-fact congressional authorization nor at-
tempted to justify the act as falling within the "short of war" exception.
Instead, he claimed, for the first time, that as Commander-in-Chief the
President had the broad power to begin a war without congressional
approval to protect an "interest of American foreign policy." 34 Tru-
man's claims stirred great debate, and when in 1951 he asserted the
authority to send troops to Europe without consulting Congress, the
Senate passed a "sense of the Senate" resolution approving the troop
deployment but requiring congressional authorization before any fur-
ther troops were deployed.
35
But Truman had set a precedent, and his successors built upon it.
Even Dwight Eisenhower, who generally worked closely with Congress
on military matters, justified the unilateral dispatch of 14,000 troops to
quell a civil war in Lebanon in 1958 on grounds of presidential prerog-
ative in "national security" matters.36 President Kennedy, during the
unilateral executive action was somehow justified. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 1790.
But f Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. 19, 27 (Special Issue 1970)
(noting that such an argument "amounts to recognition of presidential power to wage war
against weak opponents for limited purposes"). A recent resuscitation of this argument was
offered by the Defense Department to justify the Korean tree-cutting incident. See infra
note 112.
32. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 13.
33. Reveley, supra note 6, at 1263-64.
34. United States Dep't of State, Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea,
23 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173passim (1950) (quoted in Friedman, supra note 23, at 232 n.57).
"[T]his claim of presidential power was without precedent in American history." Id at 233.
See also T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 69-72 (1974).
35. Friedman, supra note 23, at 237 n.68; Reveley, supra note 6, at 1263 n.57.
36. Friedman, supra note 23, at 233 n.60 (citing A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESI-
DENCY 162 (1973)). Congress, perhaps lulled by President Eisenhower's assurances that he
would always seek their authorization, practically sanctioned presidential prerogative with a
broadly phrased Middle East Resolution in 1957. The Resolution read, in part, "if the Presie
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Cuban missile crisis, President Johnson in Vietnam and the Dominican
Republic, President Nixon in the Yom Kippur War and in the bomb-
ing of Cambodia, and President Reagan in Lebanon, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua, all took unilateral military action.37 "Every President since
World War II has asserted at one time or another that he had the au-
thority to commit the armed forces to conflict without the consent of
Congress.""
An exhaustive examination of the causes for this shift in the war
power is beyond the scope of this article.39 Those who have studied the
issue tend to focus on two general areas of causation: (1) institutional
characteristics of Congress and the President;4° and (2) developments
in United States foreign policy.4' It is enough to say that neithler of
these developments necessarly renders the notion of congressional con-
trol over war powers outmoded. It is true that the Executive by virtue
of its hierarchical structure, command of national attention, and con-
centration of power in one person, has certain institutional advantages
vis-a-vis Congress in the field of foreign affairs. It is also true that in
Congress, interests are more localized, responsibility more diffused,
and decision-making more laborious. But all of this was true, or at
least foreseeable, in 1787. The Framers gave the war powers to Con-
gress, not because it might more easily or more efficiently wield power,
but precisely because of its weaknesses; they were "for clogging rather
than facilitating war." Correlatively, investment of the war powers in
the executive branch threatened tyranny because of the President's in-
herent institutional power advantages. The location of the war powers
was thus central to the system of checks and balances.
Some have argued that an 18th century war powers clause cannot
guide us in the twentieth century.42 The Framers, they argue, cannot
have envisioned a world of nuclear arms, nor a world in which the
dent determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to
assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from
any country controlled by international communism." See T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at
74-76.
37. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 234-36 & n.65.
38. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 21.
39. See, e.g., Reveley, supra note 6, at 1265-7 1; Note, Historical and Structural Limita-
lions on Congressional Abilities to Make Foreign Policy, 50 B.U.L. REv. 51 (Special Issue
1970).
40. Reveley, supra note 6, at 1265; Note, The Appropriations Power as a Tool of Congres-
sional Foreign Policy Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. 34, 36 n.21 (Special Issue 1970).
41. NATIONAL COMMITMENTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 13-23; Reveley, supra note 6, at
1266, 1267 and n.68.
42. Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century Consti-
tution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1961). Ten years later, after experiencing the congressional-
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United States' interests would reach as far and wide as they do today.
Even were there merit to these arguments, which many people dispute,
they cannot justify violations of existing law. Those favoring executive
war-making should address themselves to amending the Constitution.
Moreover, today's circumstances underscore the necessity for strict ad-
herence to the constitutional allocation of war powers. The prospect
and danger of nuclear war, certainly the overriding concern in foreign
policy today, only reaffirms the wisdom of "clogging rather than facili-
tating war." When the Framers wrote, the nation had an interest in
avoiding war because of its weakness vis-a-vis other nations. Today,
the entire world has an interest in avoiding war because of human
weakness in the face of the destructive force of nuclear weapons.43
Neither Congress nor the people should be forced to convince the
President not to infringe upon congressional war powers; the Constitu-
tion flatly forbids him to do so.44 But where the President, who is to
enforce the law, is breaking the law, and where the judiciary, which is
to say what the law is, refuses to do so, we are left to the mercy of
presidential prerogative. The law ceases to impose limits on executive
action and executive power, freed of its constraints, shapes the world as
it pleases. When the law that is slipping into obscurity is the Constitu-
tion, we have the makings of a constitutional crisis.
III. THE MAKING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS-VIETNAM AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The origins of the constitutional war powers crisis are, as noted
above, relatively recent. President Truman, less than thirty-five years
ago, was the first President to openly challenge the limits of the war
powers clause and to assert inherent presidential authority to initiate
presidential battles over the Vietnam War, Senator Fulbright revised his opinion about the
efficacy of constitutional restraints:
In those days, [of the 1950s and 1960s] ... it was possible to forget the wisdom of
the Founding Fathers who had taught us to mistrust power, to check it and balance
it, and never to yield up the means ofthwarting it. Now, after bitter experience, we
are having to learn all over again that no single man or institution can ever be
counted upon as a reliable or predictable repository of wisdom and benevolence;
that the possession of great power can impair a man's judgment and cloud his
perception of reality; and that our only protection against the misuse of power is
the institutionalized interaction of a diversity of independent opinions.
Address by Senator Fulbright, Yale University (Apr. 3, 1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC.
10, 355-56 (1971). Senator Fulbright was not alone in drawing this lesson from the Vietnam
War. See infra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Schell, The Abolition, Part I1-A Deliberate Policy, THE NEW YORKER,
Jan. 9, 1984, at 43-94.
44. Similarly, because the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, we are not required to
"convince" prison guards not to torture prisoners or police not to coerce confessions.
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armed conffict. President Truman was also, coincidentally, the first to
engage United States forces in the Vietnam War.45 That war, and the
political struggle that it fostered at home, were to make manifest what
was, in 1950, a latent constitutional crisis.
United States combat involvement in the Vietnam War lasted
some twelve years. Its history is marked by several unilateral executive
decisions to escalate and expand the war effort, after-the-fact but open-
ended congressional authorization in the early years, and, by the early
seventies, affirmative but still relatively fruitless congressional opposi-
tion. It is also marked by a slew of judicial challenges by citizens, tax-
payers, members of Congress, and draftees; never before had so many
gone to the courts to challenge a war's legality. With one short-lived
exception, the courts left presidential usurpation unchallenged. 46 The
reasoning offered by the various courts was often inconsistent, as the
tenor of the times changed and as judicial embarassment increased.
But they were consistent about two things; no court upheld the legality
of the war effort on a theory of inherent executive war power; and no
court held the war effort illegal. Virtually all the decisions were char-
acterized by a misguided judicial restraint, usually couched in terms of
"political question."'47
45. T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 85.
46. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Judge Judd enjoined bombing of Cambodia).
47. The much-maligned "political question" doctrine, see infra notes 160-99 and accom-
panying text, received its most famous formulation in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), a
case in which the Court sought to restrict earlier broad dicta concerning nonjusticiability.
Justice Brennan lists six factors to be considered:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
poOlitical department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards
or resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
369 U.S. at 217.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the first factor is the most im-
portant, and that where a branch has acted beyond its constitutional powers, judicial review
will not be barred by consideration of "embarrassment" or "respect." See INS v. Chadha,
103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Commentators have
identified the first factor as "classical," the second two as "functional," and the last three
concerns as "prudential." See E. KEYNEs, supra note 2, at 68-74. The classical view is based
on constitutional principles of the role of the judiciary, and some argue that it is the only
justifiable ground for invoking the doctrine. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues!-4 Comment on Princole and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. Ruv. 1
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A. The War at Home-Battles Between Congress and the President
The judicial decisions cannot be understood without an under-
standing of the political interchange between Congress and the Presi-
dent through the Vietnam War years. The domestic history of that war
demonstrates how far we have come from the framework envisioned in
1787. Congressional response to the Vietnam War ranged from broad
authorization to quiet acquiescence to outright disapproval; through it
all, presidents acted unilaterally without consulting or even paying
much attention to Congress.
United States involvement in Vietnam began, not with the dis-
patch of troops, but "with more subtle investments of dollars and advi-
sors." 48 By July 1954 the executive branch had already sent a small
group of military advisors and some $2.6 billion in aid to French and
Vietnamese forces.49 From 1961 to 1964, the number of United States
military personnel mushroomed from 3,200 to 23,300, without specific
congressional approval.5" In February of 1964, President Kennedy au-
thorized United States-controlled covert military action, again without
notifying Congress.51
When, in August of 1964, two American destroyers were allegedly
attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, President Johnson retali-
ated immediately with heavy bombing raids, and only then went to
Congress.52 Congress responded almost instantaneously, passing an
open-ended Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that authorized the President to
"take all necessary measures to repel armed attack against the forces of
the United States and to prevent further aggression."'53 From 1964 to
(1959). The "functional" factors are more descriptive than normative, and provide all-too-
convenient labels for avoiding decisions. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893
(D.D.C. 1982), infra at notes 206-21 and accompanying text. Few if any courts rely solely on
the "prudential" factors, particularly where a violation of the separation of powers is at
issue. As Justice Douglas has noted, "lilt is far more important to be respectful to the Con-
stitution than to a coordinate branch of government." Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886,
894 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 548-49.
48. T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 90.
49. E. KEYNES, supra note 2, at 111.
50. Id at 112.
51. T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 98.
52. Id at 100.
53. Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), approved by the President, Aug. 10, 1964.
The Resolution passed the Senate 88-2 after only six hours of debate. In the House, forty
minutes of discussion were allotted before the Resolution was approved, 416-9. E. KEYNES,
supra note 2, at 113. As Professor Keynes points out, the overbroad language of the Resolu-
tion was not unprecedented in Congress, where similarly broad delegation of war powers
had been passed in 1955, regarding Formosa, and 1957, regarding the Middle East. Id See
also T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 72-76.
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1969, Congress proceeded to pass no less than twenty-four public laws
supporting presidential action in Vietnam.
54
Despite consistent congressional support, President Johnson's
State Department insisted, in a 1966 memorandum, that the President
had unilateral authority to commit United States Armed Forces when-
ever "the President deems such action necessary to maintain the secur-
ity and defense of the United States. '55  Thus, although President
Johnson may have appreciated the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, he did
not consider it necessary.
The subsequent history of the Vietnam War indicates that, as a
matter of fact if not law, President Johnson was correct. Beginning in
1969, Congress began to express disapproval with the war, virtually to
no avail.5 6 Between 1969 and 1973, Congress passed ten laws limiting
or restricting presidential authority to conduct the Vietnam War, but
President Nixon nonetheless took repeated unilateral action to escalate
the war effort.57 Even after the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
in 1970, congressional attempts to limit, control or end the war were
largely futile.5" Even the appropriations power proved no check to
54. E. KEYNs, supra note 2, at 114.
55. U.S. Dep't of State, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam, DEP'T ST. BULL. 474-89 (March 28, 1966). See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE WAR PowERs RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL
STUDY OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 12-13 (Comm. Print 1982) [here-
inafter COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY]. T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 124-25.
56. See, e.g., T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 1 11.
57. E. KEYNES, supra note 2, at 114-16. Thus, for example, President Nixon began the
bombing of Cambodia, in April 1970, without any real congressional consultation, despite
several opportunities to do so in confidential settings. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
STUDY, supra note 55, at 26-28. As one commentator noted, "it is a telling measure of the
estrangement between President and Congress that while the Governments of Cambodia
and South Vietnam had advance notice of the U.S. decision to attack the North Vietnamese
sanctuaries, the Congress had none." A. FRYE, A RESPONSIBLE CONGRESS: THE POLITICS
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 203 (1975).
58. President Nixon took the position that, because of his right and duty to protect
American troops, repeal of the Resolution was meaningless. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 37. Senator Eagleton relates an example of the Administra-
tion putting Congress in a no-win position. In March 1973, the Administration requested
authorization to transfer $500 million to fund the bombing of Cambodia. According to
statements by Secretary Richardson, if the authority were granted, it would be viewed as
approval of the activity, but if it was denied, the denial would "not impact on [sic] U.S. air
operations in Cambodia." T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 157.
When an absolute cut-off of all funds for military activity in Cambodia and Laos was
finally passed, the President vetoed the bill and forced a compromise, effectively a 45-day
authorization of war. In Senator Eagleton's words, "after twelve years of combat in Indo-
china, Congress finally ended our involvement by authorizing it for forty-five more days."
T. EAGLETON, supra note 34, at 182.
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presidential war-making. 9
B. The Judicial Response-Abdication in A Time of Crisis
Congressional impotence in the face of presidentialfais accomplis
was exacerbated by the judiciary's failure to enforce the separation of
powers so carefully crafted by the Framers. The Vietnam War pro-
voked unprecedented and widespread recourse to the courts. The
groundswell of litigation, unabated by the frustration of non-decision
after non-decision, indicates the extent to which Vietnam marked not
merely an unpopular war but a constitutional crisis. Litigants did not
challenge the wisdom of the war effort, but rather its constitutionality.
60
Unilateral executive initiation and escalation of an undeclared war
seemed to violate clear constitutional dictates that Congress, not the
President, commence and declare war.
No court affirmed the legality of unilateral presidential war, but
neither did any court, with one exception, declare the war illegal. Judi-
cial avoidance was consistent. In the district and circuit courts, judge
after judge declared the issue, at one level or another, for one reason or
another, non-justiciable. The Supreme Court routinely denied
certiorari.'
Yet there is a discernible development in the sophistication of de-
cisions, in the courts' ability to recognize the constitutional problem,
and in the willingness, in the abstract, to decide. The development can
be traced along chronological lines, and no doubt marks a response to
domestic conditions: the growing unpopularity of the war among the
general public, heightened conflict between Congress and the Presi-
dent, and increasingly bold assertions and acts of presidential preroga-
tive. More purely "judicial" factors also may have played a part in the
development. In 1969, the Supreme Court decided Powell v. McCor-
59. Congress' inability to control presidential war-making through its appropriation
power was not limited to the Vietnam War. The argument, sometimes offered, that Con-
gress can protect itself with the power of the purse, overlooks the reality of appropriations
practice. Control of executive action through appropriations is rendered virtually impossi-
ble by the sheer size and complexity of the budget, the need to allow flexibility in the use of
funds, and the practices of "no year" appropriations, emergency funds, and impoundment.
See Note, supra note 39, at 51, 57, 73; Note, supra note 40, at 43-45.
The argument that the power of the purse is sufficient also overlooks the Constitution.
The Framers gave Congress the power of the purse and the war powers; presumably, if the
former had been considered sufficient, art. I, § 8, cl. I 1 would have been left out.
60. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Lord, J., dissenting), afJ'dsub
nom Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 811 (1973); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 540
(N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972).
61. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S.
934 (1967).
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mack,62 cutting back significantly on what had been a dangerously
amorphous "political question" doctrine of judicial avoidance. And
throughout the years of Vietnam War litigation, one gets a sense that
the courts were influenced by creeping judicial embarrassment at the
consequences of repeated abdication in the face of clear constitutional
violations.63
The judicial response can be divided into three stages. Early
cases-most of which came before congressional and public opposition
began to mount-routinely dismissed the entire issue as a political
question.' 4 Beginning in 1970, a few courts, most notably the First and
Second Circuits, applied a more discriminating analysis. These cases
explicitly affirmed the justiciability of the existence and sufficiency of
congressional assent to war but found implied assent constitutional.65
As the war entered its concluding phase, and explicit congressional op-
position made findings of implicit assent impossible, several courts con-
tinued to find the war powers issue justiciable, but refrained from
interfering with presidential discretion in tactical decisions "winding
down" the war.6 While the development demonstrates a recognition
of the need for judicial enforcement of the Constitution, it also points
all too clearly to an ultimate lack of confidence in the judiciary's ability
to control illegal exercises of presidential power.
Luftig v. McNamara67 is representative of the first class of cases.
An army private sought to enjoin the Secretary of Defense from send-
ing him to Vietnam, on the ground that the war was unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed the matter as "obviously a political ques-
62. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
63. It became increasingly difficult to brush aside the argument that if constitutional law
is to mean anything, the judiciary must reject executive assertions of prerogative to ignore
the Constitution. Advocates of judicial restraint argued, in theory, that intervention might
threaten judicial legitimacy if a court's order was ignored. In fact, the consequences for
judicial legitimacy of repeated abdication proved at least equally, if not more, dangerous, as
it suggested that the law could not provide checks to overbroad assertions of governmental
power.
64. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970); United States v. Sisson, 294 F.
Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), af'd sub
nom. Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
65. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368
(2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, Orlando v. Laird, 404 U.S.
869 (1971).
66. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26
(1st Cir. 1971).
67. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
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tion."68 The court of appeals affirmed per curiam, finding the political
question determination "so clear that no discussion or citation of au-
thority [was] needed."69
The simplicity of the Luftig approach could not withstand re-
peated attacks, however, and when, in 1972, two judges on a three-
judge district court wanted to reach a Luftig result, they issued a fifty-
page opinion exhaustively discussing virtually every authority on the
political question doctrine.7 ° A/lee v. Laird marks a transitional case:
Its majority opinion harks back to, and attempts to rationalize, the out-
right dismissals of early Vietnam litigation, while its dissent raises the
constitutional cry that had led most courts since 1970 to assert, if not to
exercise, their duty to decide questions of unconstitutional abuses of
power.
Writing for the majority inAtlee, Judge Adams invoked a parade
of horribles to demonstrate why a court should never decide the follow-
ing questions: (1) whether military activity constitutes a "war"; (2)
whether Congress has authorized such military activity; and (3)
whether the President has unilateral authority to exercise military
power abroad.7' Each question, he determined, was a political ques-
tion, because of constitutional commitments to political branches, a
lack of judicially manageable standards, and the danger of adverse in-
ternational consequences.72 In dissent, Judge Lord strongly repudiated
68. 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966), a ffdper curiam, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). The district court also involved the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. 252 F. Supp. at 82.
69. 373 F.2d at 665. Nevertheless, the court cited two Supreme Court cases, neither of
which incurred dismissal on political question grounds. Id at 666 (citing Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (decision on merits denying writ of habeus corpus to German
national convicted by military commission); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Water-
man Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (decision on merits as to whether Civil Aeronau-
tics Act provided statutory review)).
The court hoped that its opinion would serve as a warning: "[t]he only purpose to be
accomplished by saying this much on the subject is to make it clear to others comparably
situated and similarly inclined that resort to the courts is futile, in addition to being wasteful
of judicial time. . . ." 373 F.2d at 665.
70. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court) (as eported in
the Federal Supplement, the majority opinion covers approximately twenty pages) a]JdMub
nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
71. 347 F. Supp. at 705-06.
72. Judge Adams' reasoning, if applied in a principled fashion across the board, would
eviscerate judicial review. He suggested, contrary to Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker Y.
Carr, that review is nearly always inappropriate in the realm of foreign affairs, 347 F. Supp.
at 701-03, but his rationale extends to domestic matters. Thus, he claimed that whether
Vietnam was a war was judicially unascertainable in part because the question is committed
to the executive and legislative branches, to the exclusion of the courts. This suggests, con-
trary to Supreme Court cases from Marbury to Chadha, that where the Framers chose to
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the majority's fears, and insisted that concern for the separation of
powers, on which the political question doctrine is founded, "dictates
that a court proceed to the merits of a controversy" where the executive
"exceeds its constitutional authority."7 He noted that judicial avoid-
ance would write a central provision of the Constitution out of
existence:
The effect of the majority decision is to remove an entire pro-
vision of the Constitution from judicial scrutiny. This is not a
provision of little consequence to the American people. The
harm produced by most wars is of tragic proportions, as is no
more readily evident than from the current hostilities in
Southeast Asia. If the Executive or the Legislature acts un-
constitutionally, it is not a sufficient remedy that at some fu-
ture date on election day leaders may be replaced by those
who hopefully will not violate the Constitution.74
The later Vietnam cases reflect Judge Lord's views, in the abstract,
and insist on the justiciability of the fundamental war powers question:
whether Congress has provided the constitutionally required assent to
separate powers between the Executive and the Legislature-as, for example, in the proce-
dures for legislation--they meant the Constitution to be no more than a starting point in an
extended, no-holds-barred, political struggle. But cf. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983). Such a reading belittles the notion of a written, controlling Constitution, the very
foundation for judicial review. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 48 (1803).
As to whether Congress had authorized the war, Judge Adams noted that such an in-
quiry would require "interrogation of members of Congress." 347 F. Supp. at 706. But the
judiciary parses the intent of Congress virtually every time it interprets legislation, and never
yet has such interpretation required personal interviews.
Finally, Judge Adams found that even if the court held Vietnam to be a war undertaken
without congressional authorization, it could not determine the final question: whether the
President has unilateral authority to make war. This conclusion gives presidents a blank
check in military affairs; it tells the Executive that whatever authority it asserts, it will have.
While as a practical matter this may be true, it is far from legally correct. "[Ilt is the prov-
ince.., of the judicial department to determine. . . whether the powers of any branch of
government. . . have been exercised in conformity to the Constitution; and if they have not,
to treat their acts as null and void." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506 (1969) (quot-
ing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 168, 199 (1880)).
73. 347 F. Supp. at 710 (Lord, J., dissenting).
74. Id at 709.
Adee v. Laird demonstrates the tension that led many of the post-1969 courts to insist
on some degree of justiciability but to continue to avoid decision. Judge Adams' fears run
through the literature on prudential judicial restraint, but Judge Lord's criticisms are
soundly based on the most fundamental principle of constitutional law--that the limits on
governmental power of the written Constitution must be judicially enforceable if law is to
provide any check to brute power. Judicial review derives its legitimacy from the court's
role as interpreter and enforcer of a written constitution. If vague notions of "restraint"
incapacitate the judiciary where the Constitution has been violated, judicial review itself
loses its moorings.
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military activities.7" The Second Circuit, in a series of cases beginning
in 1970, affirmed the ability and duty of the courts to decide "whether
there is any action by the Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the
military activity in question. '76 In each case, however, the court found
sufficient authorization for the Vietnam War implicit in the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, appropriations and selective service acts. It limited its
inquiry to finding sufficient "mutual participation" by Congress and
the Executive, holding that the particularform of congressional author-
ization was a political question.77
When, still later in the war, congressional opposition became so
clear that an inference of assent was no longer tenable, the courts took
a third approach to avoid challenging the status quo. For example, in
Mitchell v. Laird,71 the District of Columbia Circuit overruled its ear-
lier decision in Luftig v. McNamara,79 and asserted the authority to
determine whether involvement in Vietnam constituted a "war" and
whether Congress had authorized that war.80 The Mitchell court re-
fused to infer congressional approval from "appropriation or draft
act[s]", 81 and held the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution an insufficient 'justi-
75. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird,
452 F.2d 26, 34 (Ist Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cer. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971).
76. DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042;
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
77. The court ruled, in Orlando v. Laird, that: "The form which congressional authoriza-
tion should take is one of policy, committed to the discretion of the Congress and outside the
power and competency of the judiciary, because there are no intelligible and objectively
manageable standards by which to judge such actions" 443 F.2d at 1043-44 (citations omit-
ted). The First Circuit, in Massachusetts v. Laird, applied similar reasoning, and found that
the war had been assented to by Congress. It carefully restricted its holding to what it char-
acterized as "a situation of prolonged but undeclared hostilities, where the executive contin-
ues to act not only in the absence of any confficting Congressional claim of authority but
with steady Congressional support.. . ." 451 F.2d at 34. In direct response to this holding,
Congress has now provided the courts with an "intelligible and objectively manageable stan-
dard," in § 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution. See infra notes 181-91 and accompanying
text.
78. 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
80. 488 F.2d at 614-15.
81. Id at 615. The court wrote:
This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in vot-
ing to appropriate money or to draft men a Congressman is not necessarily approv-
ing of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or
draft act refers to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's com-
mencement and continuation might vote for the military appropriations and for
the draft measures because he was unwilling to abandon without support men al-
ready fighting. An honorable, decent, compassionate act of aiding those already in
peril is no proof of consent to the actions that placed and continued them in that
dangerous posture. We should not construe votes cast in pity and piety as though
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fication for the indefnite continuance of the war since it was repealed
by subsequent Congressional action. '8 2 Nevertheless, it refused to de-
clare the war illegal. The court's rationale for avoidance was that the
war was winding down, and absent a "clear abuse amounting to bad
faith," the President should be afforded wide latitude in bringing the
war to an end.
83
The judicial response to the longest undeclared war in United
States history is characterized by a consistent reluctance to decide
where decision might upset the status quo. At first the reluctance to
decide blinded courts to the fundamental question of law that the cases
raised: the constitutional authority of the executive to wage war.
Later, as courts began to recognize the danger of abdicating their au-
thority to decide such fundamental constitutional issues, they ap-
proached the merits, but only to affirm the status quo. Only Judge
Judd, in his quickly reversed injunction of the Cambodia bombing, had
the courage to exercise the authority that other courts were claiming.
During the Vietnam War, in the courts, in the executive branch, and
even, to a large extent, in Congress, the Constitution was more honored
in the breach than in the observance. The failure of court after court to
impose any constitutional limit on presidential war-making marked a
constitutional crisis.
IV. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION-CONGRESS
REAFFIRMS ITS WAR POWERS
The lessons of the Vietnam War were not lost on Congress. Efforts
to control and/or end the war by legislation had proved largely futile, 4
and the judicial branch had done nothing to protect Congress' preroga-
tive over war." Without presidential compliance or judicial enforce-
they were votes freely given to express consent. Hence Chief Judge Bazelon and I
believe none of the legislation drawn to the court's attention may serve as a valid
assent to the Vietnam war.
Id
82. Id. at 614 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
83. Id at 616. The Second Circuit, in Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974), applied similar reasoning in reversing the only court
to enjoin the war. Judge Judd, in Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 553, 564 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), had enjoined the bombing of Cambodia because he found it to be unauthorized by
Congress. He found that Congress had never authorized the expansion of the war to Cam-
bodia, and had in fact imposed limits ignored by the Executive. He refused to infer authori-
zation up to August 15, 1973 from a statute demanding termination on the 15th. The
Second Circuit reversed, finding the manner in which the President winds down a war a
non-justiciable political question. 484 F.2d at 1311.
84. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
85. See stupra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
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ment, the Constitution's grant of war powers to Congress meant little.
The Vietnam War had made clear that, despite the guarantees of
the Constitution, Congress would have to act affirmatively to protect
itself. In 1970, no less than ten different versions of war powers legisla-
tion were introduced in the House of Representatives. 6 For the next
three years, various versions of war powers legislation were debated
and acted upon in both Houses. The result was the War Powers Reso-
lution of 1973,87 passed over a presidential veto on November 7, 1973.
The purpose of the War Powers Resolution was to reaffirm Con-
gress' constitutional war powers.8 8 Congress was reacting to a constitu-
tional crisis that had its roots in the Korean War but had become
manifestly untenable during the Vietnam War.89 The War Powers
Resolution altered nothing in the Constitution; it sought only to create
a procedural mechanism to effectuate the constitutional scheme, 90 The
86. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 48.
87. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976)). The
Resolution is set out in full in the Appendix. 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 803, (1984).
88. As stated in the House Report on the Resolution, "[t]he committee's objective was to
reaffirm the constitutionally given authority of Congress to declare war." The House Report
pointed out that "the constitutional 'balance' of authority over warmaking has swung heav-
ily to the President in modem times. To restore the balance provided for and mandated in
the Constitution, Congress must now reassert its own prerogatives and responsibilities."
H.R. REP. No. 93-287, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2346, 2349.
Senator Javits, one of the authors of the bill, in introducing it on behalf of 57 other
Senators, said:
It is an effort to learn from the lessons of the last tragic decade of war which has
cost our Nation so heavily in blood, treasure, and morals. The War Powers Act
would assure that any future decision to commit the United States to any warmak-
Ing must be shared in by the Congress to be lawful.
119 CONG. REc. 1394 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits).
89. In 1967, Senator Fulbright pointed to the "marked constitutional imbalance between
the Executive and the Congress. . . developed in the last 25 years as a result of which the
Executive has acquired virtually unrestricted power to commit the United States abroad
politically and militarily." COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 18.
90. As Senator Muskie, floor manager of the Senate bill and a conferee, stated:
[The bill is a procedural bill, undertaken to insure consultation by the President
with Congress and undertaking to put in the hands of Congress the procedure for
terminating any hostilities into which the President may have plunged us, whether
or not his actions in so doing conformed with our view as to what his constitutional
powers might be.
119 CONG. REC. 36, 194 (1973) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
Similarly, Senator Spong wrote:
The Resolution does not add to the President's authority as Commander-in-
Chief. Indeed, considering the expansion of that authority during the past quarter-
century through custom, usage, and congressional acquiescence, there is little
power to add. The Resolution does establish by law a methodology by which Con-
gress may terminate hostilities it considers unwise or unconstitutional without re-
sort to the ultimate legislative weapon of withholding funds. ...
Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, 16
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Resolution requires the President to consult with, report to, and seek
affirmative authorization from Congress regarding the deployment of
armed forces in situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities. The
legislation achieves this through a unique mechanism-the automatic
termination requirement. Without presidential compliance with this
"fail-safe" provision, the Resolution is gutted and Congress' intent is
for naught.
The opening sections of the War Powers Resolution, entitled "Pur-
pose and Policy," represent a reassertion by Congress of its authority to
commit United States Armed Forces into hostilities. The Resolution
begins with a "Congressional declaration" that its purpose is "to fulfill
the intent of the framers of the Constitution. .. and insure that the
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply
to" the introduction and continued use of United States Armed Forces
in hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities.91
The Resolution then sets forth the authority of the President to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hos-
tilities. That authority is limited to three circumstances: "(1) a declara-
tion of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces." 92
The purpose and policy section does not have the same binding
effect as the remainder of the statute; it is not the operative language of
the Resolution. Yet, it does demonstrate that Congress saw its war
powers much as they were intended by the framers. It marks an ex-
plicit congressional rejection of the presidential assertions of unilateral
war-making authority that had proliferated since the Korean War.93
The primary function of the statute is not to set up a precise de-
lineation of those circumstances where the President can use military
force.94 Rather, it establishes a procedural mechanism for ensuring
congressional involvement at an early stage in the decision to commit
United States Armed Forces to hostilities. The statute must be read in
that light if it is to guarantee Congress its constitutional war powers.
The procedural mechanism is triggered by the reporting require-
WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 845-46 (1975). See supra note 59 on insufficiency of "withhold-
ing funds."
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a). Section 1541(b) cites the necessary and proper clause as author-
ity to enact legislation to implement constitutional powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
93. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Spong, supra note 90, at 841-45; A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY 301-03 (1973).
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ment of section 495 This section requires that in the absence of a decla-
ration of war the President must submit a report, within forty-eight
hours, to the Speaker of the House and to the President pro tempore of
the Senate in any case in which United States Armed Forces are intro-
duced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign na-
tion, while equipped for combat, except for deployments
which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training
of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United
States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in
a foreign nation.96
Section 4(a)(1) is the most important of the reporting provisions.97
Only the situations that require section 4(a)(1) reports-the commit-
ment of United States Armed Forces to hostilities or imminent hostili-
ties-trigger the Resolution's automatic termination provisions.98
Once the President reports or is required to report pursuant to section
4(a)(1), Congress has three options:
(1) Congress can refuse to give authorization, even by inaction,
in which case all United States Armed Forces must be automatically
withdrawn within sixty days; or
(2) Congress can pass a concurrent resolution mandating that the
United States Armed Forces be removed prior to the sixtieth day;99 or
95. 50 U.S.C. § 1543. Section 3 requires consultation by the President with Congress "in
every possible instance" prior to introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
imminent hostilities, and on a regular basis thereafter until United States involvement
ceases. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. This section, even though it carries no enforceable limitations, has
also been regularly disregarded by recent Presidents. See Collier, War Powers Resolution:
Presidential Compliance, CRS Issue Brief IB81050 (Oct. 26, 1983) at 12.
96. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
97. Section 4(a)(1) reports are treated unlike reports under §§ 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3). Sec-
tion 4(a)(1) reports must be referred immediately to the House Committee on International
Relations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. If Congress is adjourned
when a § 4(a)(l) report is given, the Speaker and the President pro tempore can jointly
request the President to reconvene Congress pursuant to § 5(a) of the Resolution.
98. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b), discussed infra note 100.
99. The constitutionality of the concurrent resolution provision has been called into
question by the Supreme Court's invalidation of a legislative veto in a different context. INS
v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). A distinction can be drawn, however, between the War
Powers Resolution and the statutes at issue in Chadha, Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d
575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425
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(3) Congress can declare war or give specific statutory authoriza-
tion for use of United States Armed Forces."co
The heart of the Resolution is the automatic termination provi-
(D.C. Cir. 1981), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). The legislative veto provisions in the three
latter cases were conditions on express delegations of congressional authority. Congress had
chosen to delegate its constitutional authority to one or another administrative agency, and
had sought to condition that delegation upon the retention of limited control via legislative
veto. The Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit both emphasized that such a
"condition" is unconstitutional. Authority must be delegated through the bicameralism and
presentment procedures, and such delegation can only be altered or revoked through the
same bicameralism and presentment procedures. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786; FERC, 673
F.2d at 469-70 ("merely styling something as a condition on a grant of power does not make
that condition constitutional"). This is because a delegation of authority is a legislative act,
insofar as it has the "purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of
persons. . . outside the legislative branch." Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
The War Powers Resolution alters no legal duties. Its opening and penultimate sections
expressly disavow any delegation of authority whatsoever. The Resolution essentially im-
plements the war powers clause; its purpose is "to fulfill the intent of the framers," 50 U.S.C.
§ 1541, and its effect is expressly not "to alter the constitutional authority of Congress or of
the President," nor to grant the President any more authority than he would have had in the
absence of the Resolution. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d). Thus, it would be wrong to characterize the
War Powers Resolution's concurrent resolution as a condition on delegated authority, for
Congress has not delegated any of its authority. Rather, it has clarified and implemented
the separation of powers principles inherent in the war powers clause. The Resolution, as a
legal matter, might seem to be unnecessary, as by its own terms it does nothing to alter the
constitutional status quo. As a practical matter of governance, however, it was necessary, for
presidents had increasingly misappropriated congressional war powers in the name of exec-
utive discretion and national security, and the courts had demonstrated a reluctance to inter-
vene.
The concurrent resolution provision of the War Powers Resolution is not a legislative
enactment, and thus should not be subject to bicameralism and presentment requirements.
A concurrent resolution demanding that military personnel be removed is essentially a non-
declaration of war, or a declaration of no-war. A concurrent resolution would simply be a
mark of congressional intent, a mark more explicit than silence, and therefore possibly judi-
cially enforceable. It does not alter legal rights because, according to the Constitution, the
President has no legal right to go to war until Congress so declares. The concurrent resolu-
tion is a non-declaration, a declaration that war is not declared, an articulation of silence
practically required by judicial reluctance to enforce the Constitution in the face of unarticu-
lated silence.
In fact, as a constitutional matter, Congress need not have required even a concurrent
resolution. Since wars are to be commenced only with the affirmative approval of both
Houses of Congress, one House's express disapproval should be constitutionally sufficient to
halt a war.
100. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1544(b)-(c). Special statutory procedures give concurrent and joint res-
olutions under the War Powers Resolution priority in Congress. The concurrent resolution
does not require presentment to the President, and permits troops to be disengaged prior to
the expiration of sixty days. The joint resolution requires the signature of the President and
is the method employed when Congress gives specific authority to employ United States
Armed Forces beyond sixty days. The sixty-day period can be extended to ninety days if the
President certifies to Congress that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of
United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of
bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (b).
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sion.' ° ' The effectiveness of the entire statutory scheme hinges on this
provision. It requires the removal of all United States Armed Forces
within sixty-two days of their introduction into hostilities or into situa-
tions where imminent hostilities are clearly indicated by the circum-
stances, unless Congress acts affirmatively to authorize the
involvement. 02 Termination of troop involvement must occur even if
Congress does nothing; there is no requirement of congressional disap-
proval. This comports with the constitutional scheme, which gives
Congress the power to declare war, and not the obligation to negative
it. It was specifically meant to address situations such as Vietnam,
where Congress was faced with a fait accompli and the virtually impos-
sible task of halting a presidential war.10 3
The importance of this automatic termination provision cannot be
underestimated. Senator Javits referred to the House of Representa-
tive's agreement to automatic termination as "a historic break-
through."'1 4 Retaining the automatic cut-off provision was no easy
matter; numerous efforts were made to amend it out, 105 and it was the
single most important reason for the Nixon veto.1° 6 The provision en-
sures that Congress is relieved of the unconstitutional burden of acting
affirmatively to stop a presidential war by two automatic mechanisms.
101. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
102. The termination provision, § 5(b) states:
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be
submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier, the Presi-
dent shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which
such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1)
has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United
States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physi-
cally unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such
sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if
the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of the United States Armed Forces requires
the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt
removal of such forces.
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
103. As Senator Javits, one of the principal authors of the bill, stated:
The approach taken in the War Powers Bill reverses the situation by placing the
burden on the Executive to come to Congress for specific authority. The sponsors
of the Bill believe that this provision [the 60 day automatic cutoff] will provide an
important national safeguard against creeping involvement in future Vietnam style
wars.
119 CONG. RFc. 1400 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits). See also Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.
Supp. 893, 899-900 (D.D.C. 1982).
104. 3. JAVITs, JAvrrs, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PUBLIC MAN 411 (1981); see also
COMMITrEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 145-46.
105. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
106. President Nixon's Message to the House of Representatives Vetoing the War Powers
Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893, 894 (Oct. 24, 1973).
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First, the termination provision is triggered by objective circumstances.
Whether or not a section 4(a)(1) report is actually filed, if objective cir-
cumstances are such that the President should have filed a report but
did not, the sixty-day cut-off period is triggered. °7 Second, at the close
of that sixty-day period, termination is to occur automatically unless
Congress takes certain actions to affirmatively approve the continued
presence of United States Armed Forces in a situation of hostilities or
imminent hostilities. The termination provision gives meaning and ef-
fect to congressional inaction. 0 8  Without the provision the statute
would be of little value: it would leave the power to commence war in
the hands of the President and would do nothing to alleviate Congress'
unconstitutional burden.
10 9
107. The Lebanon Resolution, SJ. Res. 159, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC.
S13,167-68 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983); id. at H7726-27 (House approval), discussed infra at
notes 138-41 and accompanying text, demonstrates that objective circumstances trigger the
§ 4(a)(1) reporting and § 5(b) termination provisions. The Lebanon Resolution includes a
determination that "the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution be-
came operative on August 29, 1983." SJ. Res. 159, § 2(a)(5); § 2(b). In the extended de-
bates on this resolution, there was virtually unanimous agreement that "hostilities" existed
in Lebanon, and that the existence of such hostilities triggered § 4(a)(1) and § 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S 12,170-72 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983)(re-
marks of Sen. Byrd); id at S12,176-77 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (60-day requirement is
self-executing regardless of whether a report is filed); id at S12,177-90 (remarks of Sens.
Riegle, Zorinsky, Bentsen, Exon, Bumpers, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd and Eagleton). As the
language of the Lebanon Resolution makes clear, it was the existence of hostilities per se,
and not the subsequent passage of a resolution by Congress, that legally triggered the report-
ing requirements. As Senator Byrd succinctly explained:
Since the first two of our Marines were killed on August 29 our men have come
under hostile fire. We have returned that fire in self-defense. The Marine com-
mander of our forces in Lebanon has awarded hostile fire pay for the entire Marine
contingent for the month of August. He was right in doing so, and I am sure he
will do so for the month of September.
Last month was the first time since the multinational force was introduced a
year ago that hostile fire pay was awarded. Last month was the first instance in
which an American Marine died as a result of direct hostile action.
So it is a clear sign that circumstances have changed in the last few weeks, and
because of these changed circumstances, there should not be any doubt that full
congressional participation is now required regarding U.S. policy toward Lebanon.
Id at S12,170.
While as a practical matter, presidential reluctance to follow the law required Congress
to act affirmatively, as a legal matter the trigger is automatic, and should be enforceable by a
court. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. See also Tribe, The Legislative Veto
Decision: A Law By.Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 20 n.95 (1984) (War Pow-
ers Resolution reporting and termination requirements "must be triggered by the objective
presence of events such as 'hostilities' ").
108. As such, the provision can be anlogized to "sunset laws" which routinely assign op-
erational meaning to congressional inaction. See Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid-
Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.. 515, 528-29
(1982).
109. As the Court in Crockett v. Reagan found:
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V. MORE OF THE SAME-PRESIDENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Congress assumed that the President would abide by the War
Powers Resolution and would consult, report responsibly, and termi-
nate the involvement of United States Armed Forces as the statute re-
quires. As Senator Javits stated: "The thirty-day provision [sixty days
in the final Resolution] contained in Section 5 thus assumes that the
President will act according to law. No other assumption is possible
unless we are to discard our whole constitutional system.""' Congress'
assumption was misplaced. Presidents have not adhered to the statute's
requirements, but have continued the practice of unilateral presidential
wars. The history below demonstrates that congressional action alone
cannot redress the constitutional imbalance effected by executive usur-
pation. Without the force of law, the War Powers Resolution cannot
resolve the continuing constitutional crisis.
One of the earliest examples of a failure to report concerned Air
Force reconnaissance flights over Cambodia in late 1974. A number of
planes returned with battle damage. The Ford Administration claimed
it did not need to report because the incidents were "isolated" and
United States forces were merely present in areas where hostilities were
occurring. Representative Findley, principle author of the reporting
provisions, disagreed: "The fact that an attack upon U.S. forces may
be 'unanticipated' and 'isolated' is entirely irrelevant for purposes of
the reporting requirement. What is relevant is that flying over enemy
territory inherently carries with it the strong and likely possibility (i.e.,
'clear potential') of drawing fire." '' Subsequent presidents have fol-
lowed President Ford's interpretation of the reporting requirement in
almost every instance.
11 2
[T]he automatic cutoff after 60 days was intended to place the burden on the Presi-
dent to seek positive approval from the Congress, rather than to require the Con-
gress positively to disapprove the action, which had proven so politically difficult
during the Vietnam War. To give force to congressional power to declare war,
Presidential warmaking would not be justified by congressional silence, but only by
a congressional initiative to "declare war."
558 F. Supp. at 899.
110. 119 CONG. REc. 1401 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits). At another point, Javits
stated that "[w]e all believe that if we codify the law, as we plan here, and if this becomes the
law, the President will obey it. At least, he will make every good faith effort to obey it." 118
CONG. REc. 11,039 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
111. COMMIT=EE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 176.
112. See generally, id at 169-254. The danger of allowing the President to bypass the
War Powers Resolution reporting and consultation requirements, in what might be viewed
arguably as the twilight zone of concurrent authority, is illustrated by President Ford's uni-
lateral use of 300 soldiers, squadrons of F-4s, and B-52 bombers to cut down a tree in 1976.
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The Vietnam evacuation and the Mayaguez incident provide ex-
amples of presidential reluctance to report under section 4(a)(1) even
when it would entail no immediate consequences. In the Vietnam
evacuation, which lasted nineteen hours, four marines were killed,
ground forces returned fire, and fighter aircraft were required to sup-
press Vietnamese artillery fire on the evacuating helicopters."13 Al-
though the situation clearly called for a section 4(a)(1) report, President
Ford submitted only a vague "communication" to the Speaker "to keep
the Congress fully informed on this matter, and taking note of the pro-
vision of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution." ' 1 4 In the Mayaguez
situation, which involved intense fighting, bombing, and the death of at
least thirty-eight marines, President Ford wrote another "communica-
tion," in accordance with the President's "desire that Congress be in-
formed on this matter and taking note of Section 4(a)(1) of the War
Powers Resolution.""' 5 Again, the President did not acknowledge that
he was required to report under section 4(a)(1).
16
In May and June 1975, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held
The tree, in a demilitarized zone in Korea, allegedly blocked the United States sentry's view.
The United States wanted to cut it down; North Korea wanted it to remain. When an
American tree-cutting party was attacked by North Koreans, President Ford responded by
raising a worldwide defense alert, sending in 300 soldiers, with tactical air support from as
far away as Idaho, and cutting down the tree. Some members of Congress felt that the
deployment of such force in a situation demanding worldwide alert raised the possibility of
imminent hostilities, and that they should have been consulted under the Resolution. The
Administration offered a number of responses, but apparently the underlying rationale of-
fered in executive councils was that with such an overwhelming show of force, North Korea
would never fight back. Id at 225-28.
113. President Ford's Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Reporting on the
Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Others from South Vietnam (Apr. 30, 1975), reprinted in 3
M. GLENNON & T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND
SOURCES 151-52 (1980).
114. SUBCOMM. ON INT'L SEC. & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., lST SESS., THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RELEVANT Docu-
MENTS, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS 43 (Comm. Print 1981). State Department Legal Ad-
visor Monroe Leigh later argued that § 4(a)(1) was not necessarily triggered "because the
proximity of Communist artillery fire changed from day to day." COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 189.
115. President Ford's Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate Reporting on U.S. Actions in the Recovery of the SS Mayaguez, 1 PUB. PA-
PERS 669 (May 15, 1975).
116. This is the closest any President has come to submitting a § 4(a)(1) report. That the
"taking note of" language, however, was a deliberate avoidance of the triggering require-
ment can no longer be doubted. After he left office, President Ford stated that he "never
admitted that the WPR was applicable" to instances where he had committed United States
Armed Forces. He further believed that the Resolution was not constitutionally binding on
the President. The President and Political Leadershi, in 2 THE VIRGINIA PAPERS ON THE
PRESIDENCY 28 (K. Thompson ed. 1980).
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hearings on presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolu-
tion.117 Committee members expressed concern regarding the Presi-
dent's failure to designate the particular section under which he was
reporting, the fact that personal "communications" were offered in-
stead of required reports, and the narrow manner in which the execu-
tive had defined hostilities.'
8
President Carter, despite early assurances that his administration
would comply with the War Powers Resolution, did no better. In his
communication on the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the President did
not even refer to section 4, yet it was clear that section 4(a)(1) had been
triggered.1 19 Instead, he contended that the operation was conducted
under his powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.120 His
administration gave an especially technical reading to the statute, argu-
ing that United States Armed Forces had not been introduced into a
situation of hostilities or imminent hostilities because the first evening
that the rescue team went to Iran did not involve hostilities.' 2 '
The Reagan Administration has had the worst record of perform-
ance under the Resolution. In three situations (El Salvador, Grenada
and Lebanon) where reporting under section 4(a)(1) was clearly re-
quired, President Reagan failed to make any report citing this section.
There have been at least fifty-six United States Armed Forces person-
nel in El Salvador since 1981.122 These personnel have been involved
117. War Powers: 4 Test of Compliance Relative to the Danag Sealft, the Evacuation of
Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the
Subcomm, on Int'l Sec. & Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
118. The Executive maintained its view, contrary to the definition in the House Report,
that hostilities and imminent hostilities did not encompass "irregular or infrequent violence
which may occur in a particular area." Hearings, supra note 117, at 38-39 (statement of
Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, & Martin R. Hoffman, Gen'l Counsel, Dep't
of Defense). The State Department admitted that even though the Saigon evacuation expe-
dition of 1975 "was at least a 4(a)(1) situation. . . it didn't seem to us that we were called
upon to tell Congress exactly which subparagraph applied." Id at 10 (statement of Monroe
Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State), quoted in COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY,
supra note 55, at 201.
119. The rescue attempt involved United States Armed Forces, helicopters, C- 130 trans-
ports and included an attack on the embassy as part of the plan. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 239-41.
120. President Carter's Letter to Congress Reporting on the Rescue Attempt for Ameri-
can Hostages in Iran, 1 PuB. PAPERS 777, 779 (Apr. 26, 1980).
121. Legal Opinion of Lloyd N. Cutler, Counsel to the President, on War Powers Consul-
tation Relative to the Iran Rescue Mission (May 9, 1980), reprinted in THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 114, at 49; see also COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 243.
122. The latest official reports set the number of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador at
97. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, at A3, col.l.
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in hostilities and are continuously subject to imminent hostilities.'2 3
They have been photographed carrying grenades and machine guns in
the areas of heaviest fighting, 2 4 have participated in battles where one
was wounded, 2- and are helping to direct the fighting against the
guerillas.
Significantly, a report by the Comptroller General points out that
United States military personnel in El Salvador are drawing special
"hostile fire pay." To receive such "hostile fire pay" a soldier must sign
a monthly statement saying, "I was subjected to hostile fire," and the
approving officer must certify that the soldier "was subjected to small
arms fire or he was close enough to the trajectory, point of impact or
explosion of hostile ordnance so that he was in danger of being
wounded, injured or killed."' 126 Despite this strong evidence, the Rea-
gan Administration has refused to submit a section 4(a)(1) report. 2 7
President Reagan's actions regarding the commitment of United
State Armed Forces to Lebanon demonstrate: (1) the continued refusal
of the Executive to report under section 4(a)(1); (2) the refusal to, ac-
knowledge that the Executive is bound by the Resolution; and (3) the
Executive's refusal to be bound by legislation signed pursuant to the
Resolution. Congressional attempts to invoke the War Powers Resolu-
tion regarding Lebanon make clear that if Congress must act affirma-
tively to trigger the Resolution's "automatic" provision, the
Resolution's purpose is frustrated.
123. For example, "on April 4, 1981, 100 armed personnel, part of the military forces of
the FMLN, attacked the San Salvador air base housing the United States Military Advisors
involved in the helicopter 'counter-insurgency program."' Complaint, Crockett v. Reagan,
558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
124. On February 11, 1982, a crew from Cable News Network videotaped three United
States military "advisors" carrying M-16 rifles and M-79 grenades in a guerrilla-contested
area in the far eastern portion of he country. Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1982, at Al.
125. On February 2, 1983, the United States admitted that a United States soldier suf-
fered a leg wound from ground fire during a helicopter mission. He was one of five United
States soldiers accompanying Salvadoran personnel abroad two helicopters engaged in a
combat mission intended to make direct contact with a Salvadoran unit on a tactical opera-
tion. The second helicopter drew fire as well. Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1983, at Al. See also
Wash. Post, June 24, 1982, at A24 (United States advisors "fighting side by side" with El
Salvador troops).
126. See Wash. Post, July 30, 1982, at A24. The report states that the Pentagon initially
designated all of El Salvador as a "hostile fire zone," which would have made unnecessary
monthly reports by each soldier. Applicability o Certain United States Laws That Pertain to
U.S. Military Involvement in El Salvador, General Accounting Office, Report by the Comp-
troller General, GAO ID-82-53 (1982). This tentative ruling was, however, reversed "for
policy reasons" presumably because it would have required a report to Congress under the
War Powers Resolution.
127. RELEVANT DoCuMENTs, supra note 114, at 51-52.
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
In several reports to Congress on Lebanon, the President has never
referred to a specific section of the Resolution. On August 25, 1982,
800 marines arrived in Beirut to provide security for the evacuation of
the PLO. Prior to the introduction of troops, the administration had
indicated that if troops were sent to Beirut the President would send
Congress a report citing the "equipped for combat" section 4(a)(2).
Senators Percy and Pell, and Representative Zablocki wrote to Presi-
dent Reagan, asserting that such a report would not accurately reflect
the situation in Beirut, and that a section 4(a)(1) report was necessary
to comply with the War Powers Resolution. 2 ' On August 24, the Pre-
sident filed a report "in accordance with [his] desire that the Congress
be fully informed on this matter" and "consistent with" the War Pow-
ers Resolution, but citing no specific section. 29 The marines left Leba-
non, temporarily, on September 4, 1982.130
On September 20, 1982, President Reagan announced that the
marines were returning to Lebanon as part of a multinational
peacekeeping force.' Senator Percy and Senator Pell again wrote to
the President, urging him to file his report under section 4(a)(1), and
not section 4(a)(2). They pointed to the increased "bitterness and vola-
tility of the situation in Beirut."'' 32  On September 29, 1983, 1200
marines arrived in Lebanon. On the same day the President sent a
communication to Senator Thurmond, President pro tempore of the
Senate, again informing him of the deployment "consistent with the
War Powers Resolution" but failing to cite any specific section.
33
President Reagan thus sidestepped the sixty-day automatic cut-off by
refusing to acknowledge that the "communications" were reports as re-
quired by section 4(a)(1). The situation in Lebanon deteriorated rap-
idly. 3 4  On August 28 and 29, United States marine positions were
128. 40 CONG. Q. 2158 (1982).
129. Id at 2157.
130. Prior to their redeployment, more violence erupted in Lebanon. Bashir Gemayel
was assassinated and his supporters massacred several hundred refugees.
131. Address to the Nation Announcing the Formation of a New Multinational Force, 18
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1182-84 (Sept. 20, 1982) cited in R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLICATION IN THEORY AND PRACTIcE (1983).
132. 129 CONG. REC. S11,961 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1983).
133. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 18
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1232 (Sept. 29, 1982) 1232, cited in TURNER, supra note 131.
134. In April, 1983, a car bomb attack on the United States Embassy killed 63 people.
"By mid-to-late August, 1983, Druze, Shia, and Syrian leaders had begun making state-
ments to the effect that the Multinational Force, especially the U.S. element, was one of 'the
enemy."' On August 12, 1983, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified the Secre-
tary of Defense that he would start authorizing hostile fire pay as of August 31. Department
of Defense Report on Lebanon ("Long Commission Report"), Dec. 20, 1983, cited in 130
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attacked; the marines returned fire. On August 29, two marines were
killed and fourteen wounded. 135 Attacks continued through the next
weeks, killing two more marines. Despite the clear triggering of section
4(a)(1), 136 the President still refrained from reporting under that
provision.1
37
As presidential recalcitrance continued, Congress was forced to
take the initiative. As Senator Bentsen said, "if the War Powers Act is
not invoked under these kinds of conditions, then it is worthless."'
138
Senator Kennedy insisted that the President's failure to cite section
4(a)(1) was not determinative because the provision's requirements
were self-executing.1 39 On September 28, 1983, Congress passed legis-
lation declaring that sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) of the War Powers Reso-
lution had been triggered on August 29, when the first two marines
were killed. However, enforcement of the Resolution's procedures by
legislation required a costly substantive compromise; the only bill that
received sufficient support simultaneously authorized the continued de-
ployment of United States forces for eighteen months from the date of
enactment. 140 By the time the Lebanon issue arose in Congress, United
States involvement was practically a foregone conclusion, and the only
real debates concerned how long, not whether, to authorize continued
United States presence.
14 '
The Administration's response to the Lebanon Resolution was
CONG. REC. E45 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1984) (Cong. Lowry); Democratic Study Group, Special
Report: Lebanon and the War PowersAct, No. 09-11, 11 (Sept. 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
"DSG"].
135. Letter from President Reagan to Senator Thurmond, Aug. 20, 1983, reprnted in 129
CONG. REC. S12,175 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983).
136. See 129 CONG. REC. S12,175 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (Sen. Byrd's plea for § 4(a)(1)
report).
137. On September 13, 1983, President Reagan authorized air strikes against the opposi-
tion shelling positions, and next day United States forces shelled Druze and Moslem posi-
tions in the hills above Beirut. DSG, supra note 134, at 12.
138. 129 CONG. Rnc. S12,180 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983).
139. Id at S12,176 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983). Senator Byrd cited the authorization of
hostile fire pay, id at S12,170 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983), and said he had said he had spoken
to Senator Javits who agreed that "recent events had triggered the 4(a)(1) mechanism." Id
at S12,172.
140. 129 CONG. REc. H7593 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983). The bill required periodic reports
from the President, and although "protective measures" were not precluded, congressional
authorization was required for "any substantial expansion in the number or role of United
States Armed Forces." Id Congress specifically incorporated the conditions of the Leba-
non Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, 129 CONG. REc. H3441 (daily ed. June 1, 1983), into
its Lebanon Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 364. Id
141. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S12,181 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Exon)
(noting that although he was against involvement from the beginning, it was now too late to
"cut and run").
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consistent with its earlier refusals to recognize Congress' legitimate war
powers. Secretary Schultz stated that the Lebanon Resolution would
not affect the President's power. 142 Schultz refused to guarantee that
the marines would be withdrawn within the congressionally specified
period, or that the force would not be substantially increased.1 43 Rel-
gan signed the Resolution on October 2, 1983 with the following
caveat:
[W]ith regard to the congressional determination that the
requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution
became operative on August 29, 1983, I would note that the
initiation of isolated or infrequent acts of violence against
United States Armed Forces does not necessarily constitute
actual or imminent involvement in hostilities .... 144
He also did not cede that congressional authorization was needed for
an extension of the marines' stay in Lebanon beyond the eighteen-
month period.
145
Although the Resolution limited military activities to the protec-
tion of United States soldiers, 146 United States airstrikes continued, and
in December American fighter bombers blasted Syrian positions. 147 On
February 7, the President announced that United States forces were
authorized to shell any Syrian positions, not just those attacking Amer-
ican positions.148 The next day the New Jersey conducted the heaviest
American bombardment since Vietnam. 149 The indiscriminate shell-
ing, which hit small towns in the hills, killed scores of civilians.
Speaker O'Neill contended that the shelling was "absolutely not" per-
mitted by 'the Lebanon Resolution and even Senate Majority Leader
Baker questioned its legality. 1 0 Larry Speakes, White House Press
Secretary, claimed the bombing was necessary to protect the American
forces, and that the President had authority outside of the legislation to
142. 41 CONG. Q. 2095 (1983); see 129 CONG. REC. 13,033 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
143. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
144. 41 CONG. Q. 2142 (1983).
145. Id. Immediately subsequent to the passage of this act two marines were killed in
mid-October, on October 23, 241 marines were killed in a bomb explosion at the marine
compound.
146. 129 CONG. REC. H7593 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1981).
147. 130 CONG. Rac. S737 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984). Senator Kennedy articulated his
anguish arising from the apparent impotence of Congress in the face of these events when he
lamented that it was if Congress had said to the President, "[t]ake the New Jersey and take
1,600 Marines and do what you want in Lebanon. Do not call us until after the 1984 elec-
tion." 130 CONG. REc. S737 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984).
148. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1984, at A9, col. 3.
149. 130 CONG. Rac. H701 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1984) (statement of Rep. Oakar).
150. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
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engage in the bombing. 5'
The President's failure to report under section 4(a)(1) and his as-
sertion of inherent authority to authorize military activities was re-
peated during the invasion of Grenada. On October 25, 1983, 1900
marines invaded Grenada. In fighting that continued for a week, at
least 160 Grenadians were killed and 100 wounded; fifty to sixty
Cubans were killed and 600 captured; and eighteen Americans were
killed and eighty-eight wounded.'52
The decision to invade was made unilaterally by the Executive.
5 3
On the day of the invasion the President sent letters to the House and
the Senate notifying them and asserting that his communication was
"consistent with" the War Powers Resolution. 154 Members of Congress
151. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, at A18, col. 6. The bombing continued and escalated as
United States troops were withdrawn in February to ships offshore, reminiscent of the
Nixon-Kissinger Cambodian bombings of the final months of Vietnam. Conflicting state-
ments from those in charge of the bombing and those responsible for public relations
demonstrate the extent to which the Reagan Administration "honors" the Lebanon
Resolution:
Take Tuesday, February 14th. The navy secretary, Mr. John Lehman, speak-
ing the truth, said that the American warships off Lebanon's coast were firing their
guns in support of the Lebanese army, and that their action was "not linked to
specific fire at the marines." President Reagan's spokesman, Mr. Larry Speakes,
said that this was "incorrect;" the navy would fire its guns only to protect Ameri-
cans in Beirut, or their fellow-members of the multinational force. Mr. Speakes,
unlike Mr. Lehman, was no doubt remembering that many in congress, including
several senior Republicans, had last week lustily questioned whether firing in sup-
port of the Lebanese army was consistent with the resolution, passed in September,
which provides the legal framework for America's military involvement in
Lebanon.
THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18-24, 1984, at 21.
152. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1983, A18, col. 6. The attack included continuous airstrikes,
bombing of anti-aircraft positions, helicopter assaults and a beach landing. Id
153. The President's actions in Grenada are currently under challenge in Conyers v. Rea-
gan, No. 83-3430 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 1984) (available on LEXIS, GenFed library, Cases file).
In Conyers, a suit under the war powers clause, plaintiff members of Congress claimed that
the President's invasion of Grenada violated Congress' right to declare war. The defendants
moved to dismiss, arguing that the case presented a political question, that plaintiffs lacked
standing, and that the court should exercise its equitable discretion to dismiss the case. The
defendants also asserted that the President had the unilateral right to use force because his
goal, in part, was to protect United States citizens. See Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Conyors v. Reagan, No. 83-3430 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 7,
1983). The district court dismissed the case in the exercise of its equitable discretion. See
Conyers v. Reagan, No. 83-3430 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 1984). The case in on appeal to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.
154. Reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. S14,610 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1983). The administration
justified the invasion on two grounds: a request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States to intervene, and the protection of the lives of 1,000 Americans on the island. The
OECS request does not provide a legal basis for presidential usurpation of war powers; in
fact, the invasion violated Organization of American States agreements, as well as basic
tenets of international law. The foundation for the latter justification has been subsequently
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were not satisfied that this conformed to the Resolution because, yet
again, the President had failed to file the report pursuant to section
4(a)(l).1'" Speaker O'Neill pointed out, however, that "legally speak-
ing, you don't have to pass the resolution [determining that the sixty-
day provision is triggered] in order for the sixty-day clock to start ....
The act is not dependent on a Presidential determination of hostilities.
If it was, it really would have no teeth whatsoever."'
156
The Administration refused to say how long the troops would stay
in Grenada. It asserted that even if Congress attempted to curtail their
stay, the President would not necessarily heed their demand.1 57 On
November 17, the Administration announced that the troops would be
pulled out by December 23, just a few days before the deadline. 158 Ap-
parently all but 300 troops have been pulled out.
159
The history of presidential war-making since the passage of the
War Powers Resolution sadly reaffirms the impotence of Congress to
singlehandedly challenge presidential usurpations of its war powers.
Every president has managed to frustrate the terms and requirements
of the War Powers Resolution. President Reagan has done so even
when Congress has passed further legislation reaffirming the applica-
bility of their earlier law. El Salvador, Lebanon, and Grenada offer
telling examples of the inability of unenforced law to restrict presiden-
tial prerogative.
eroded by a congressional fact-finding mission. The vice chancellor of St. George's Medical
School told Rep. Louis Stokes that prior to the invasion "the students were never in any
actual danger and never even saw a soldier." 129 CONG. REC. E5582 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
1983) (Rep. Louis Stokes' "Diary" from fact-finding trip to Grenada, appearing in the Clev.
Plain Dealer, Nov. 13, 1983). After Bishop's assassination, officials of the Peoples Revolu-
tionary Council had not only assured Embassy and school officials of the safety of Ameri-
cans, but had offered to help evacuate any Americans who wished to leave. Id See also 129
CONG. REc. H8639 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Edgar), 129 CONG. REC.
S15,428 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1983) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
155. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at AI8, col. 1 (Sen. Nunn says enforcing 60-day
requirement is a "matter of principle"); 129 CONG. REc. S 14,869, S 14,875 (daily ed. Oct. 28,
1983) (Sen. Hart asserts § 4(a)(1) situation); id at H8885 (Reps. Broomfield and Walker
invoked § 4(a)(1)). Both the Senate and the House passed legislation stating that for pur-
poses of§ 5(b), the 60-day requirement, § 4(a)(1) had become operative the day of the inva-
sion. 129 CONG. REC. S14,874 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983) (Senate amendment to debt ceiling
bill passed); 41 CONG. Q. 2359-60 (1983) (House passage of H.J. Res. 402 on Nov. 1, 1983).
The legislation eventually died.
156. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
157. 129 CONG. Ric. S14,870 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hart on testi-
mony of Deputy Secretary of State Dam before Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
158. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
159. The question of what happens now that hostilities have ended, but the troops are still
there is, as yet, unanswered.
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VI. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION-THE NEED
FOR JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
The history of United States involvement in foreign hostilities
since 1973 underscores what is clear on the face of the War Powers
Resolution: without the force of law, the Resolution cannot do what
Congress intended it to do. Presidents, who have since Truman as-
serted and exercised unilateral war power without challenge from the
courts, have little incentive to comply with the War Powers Resolution.
As long as a President avoids a report under section 4(a)(1), and every
President has, he can render the Resolution powerless. If neither the
President nor the courts will trigger the Resolution's automatic cut-off
provision, the burden is left to Congress to go forward and affirma-
tively seek the termination of hostilities. This is precisely the burden
that the Framers did not intend Congress to bear, and it is precisely the
burden that Congress sought to alleviate by enacting the War Powers
Resolution. Only if the Resolution is given the force of law, by volun-
tary presidential compliance or by judicial enforcement, will it serve to
redress the constitutional balance. We know from history that reliance
on presidential compliance is hopelessly misplaced.
Judicial practice during the Vietnam War suggests that avoidance
is nonetheless all too likely, on the grounds that the war powers issue
presents a nonjusticiable "political question." Such a result, however,
is unjustifiable. The later Vietnam cases establish conclusively that the
fundamental war powers issue-which branch has the authority to in-
volve the United States in a war-is not a political question. The War
Powers Resolution addresses the specific difficulties that nonetheless
were considered to warrant abstention in the later Vietnam cases. Judi-
cial refusals to enforce the War Powers Resolution will give nunc pro
tunc effect to President Nixon's overridden veto as well as to several
failed attempts to amend the legislation. If the Constitution and Con-
gress' reaffirmation of the Constitution are to be honored, judicial ac-
tion is required.
Congress has acted affirmatively to recapture its constitutional war
powers in the only way that it can: by enacting legislation. But a stat-
ute gains the force of law only where the judiciary performs its consti-
tutional duty to enforce the law. This is especially true where, as here,
the statute is directed at the Executive, who has consistently ignored its
proscription. Congress has exercised its responsibility under the Con-
stitution; it is up to the courts to exercise theirs.
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS.ANGELES L4WREVIEW [Vol. 17
A. Political Questions: Broad Claims
The vast majority of courts 160 and commentators 16 1 have consist-
ently rejected broad claims of "political question" regarding executive
violations of the separation of powers. Nonetheless, executive defend-
ants persist in seeking to resurrect long-rejected shibboleths about the
impropriety of all judicial review touching on "foreign affairs," "na-
tional security," or "executive discretion."' 162 These overbroad claims
should be put to rest. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to
let such "talismanic incantations"'' 63 bar its review of constitutional vi-
olations.16' While some of the earlier Vietnam War decisions insisted
on such a broad reading of "political question," later courts applied the
"more discriminating analysis" required by the doctrine. 165
The "political question" doctrine, in its classic formulation, for-
bids judicial review of questions constitutionally committed to a coor-
dinate political branch.166 The doctrine has its roots in the separation
of powers and judicial respect for the coequal branches. However, at
the same time, the judiciary must ensure that the separation of powers
principles embodied in the Constitution are not breached. Thus, where
litigants challenge governmental conduct that infringes upon the con-
160. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982); United States v. United
States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952). Judge Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit succinctly disposed of political
question arguments in a case involving a PLO terrorist attack on an Israeli bus as follows:
[To invoke the political question doctrine] would be to counter the movement of
courts and scholars in the opposite direction. Indeed, commentators have noted
the "judicial indifference and scathing scholarly attack" recently directed at the
political question doctrine, see McGowan, Congressmen in Court, 15 GA. L. REy.
241, 256 (1981). As Judge McGowan has noted, other than the Taiwan treaty case,
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), the last Supreme Court case to cite the
doctrine in any meaningful way was Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), and the
last Supreme Court case to rely squarely on it was Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946). See Mc Gowan, supra, at 256-57.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, No. 81-1870, slip op. at 49 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (available on LEXIS, GenFed library, Cases file)
161. See, e.g., Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO.
L. REv. 65 (1977); Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976); Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
162. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dellums v. Smith, 573
F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 599 (D.D.C.
1983); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982).
163. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
164. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
165. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying
text.
166. 369 U.S. at 217.
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stitutional power of a coequal branch, judicial restraint cannot be justi-
fied.167 "It would stand the political question doctrine on its head to
require the Judiciary to defer to another branch's determination that its
acts do not violate the separation of powers principle.
1 68
In Baker v. Carr,169 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated ear-
lier dicta that the conduct of "foreign affairs" is exempt from judicial
review simply because committed to "the political branches." 170 The
invocation of "foreign affairs" and "national security" did not foreclose
judicial review of President Carter's agreement with Iran concerning
the release of hostages,' 7 ' President Nixon's efforts to withhold the
Watergate tapes 172 or suppress the Pentagon Papers, 173 or President
Truman's war-time seizure of the Youngstown steel mills.'
74
The later Vietnam War cases establish that claims based on presi-
dential expropriation of congressional war powers are neither constitu-
tionally committed to a coequal branch, nor barred by their
implications for foreign affairs. 175 The War Powers Resolution itself
only underscores the appropriateness of judicial review, for it consti-
tutes a strong statement by Congress that its war powers are not to be
167. The Court in Baker v. Carr wrote, "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure
been committed to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
369 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added). See also INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969).
168. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 419 (9th Cir. 1980), aft'd, INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
2764 (1983). The court continued, "It is the Judiciary's prerogative, after a showing that the
source of a claimant's appeal is not textually committed to another branch, to adjudicate a
claimed excess by a coordinate branch of its constitutional powers." Id See also INS v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
169. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
170. Id at 211 & n.31.
171. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
172. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
173. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
174. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The courts have not
hesitated to reach the merits in challenges to the Executive's foreign relations and Com-
mander-in-Chief powers in war, Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (reviewed Presi-
dent's power to expel enemy aliens during wartime); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1962) (Court decided question of President's power to take independent military action in
the nation's defense during the Civil.War); and in peace, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
(reviewed executive power to revoke passports); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965)
(reviewed executive power to refuse to validate passports), Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1 (1957)
(reviewed executive power to affect military law and its jurisdiction over civilian personnel).
175. See, e.g., Massachussetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443
F.2d 1039 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 889 (1971); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538
(N.D. Cal. 1970), rep'd on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972).
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bypassed by executive action. 176 Moreover, as established below, the
Resolution speaks directly to more specific concerns falling under the
rubric of "political question." Neither general nor specific invocations
of the "political question" doctrine justify judicial abdication where the
President usurps the war powers.
B. Political Questions-More Specylc Concerns
Courts hearing challenges to the Vietnam War found a number of
reasons for abstaining from decision or for upholding the status quo. 1
77
Specifically, the courts sometimes claimed that they could not deter-
mine whether the conflict was a "war" within the meaning of Article
1,178 or whether Congress had assented to the conflict in an appropriate
form.' 7 9 An underlying rationale for abstention was that the remedy
required-a declaration that the war was illegal or a court order to
enjoin the hostilities-was considered an improper interference with
the prerogatives of the political branches.1
8 0
The War Powers Resolution removes these restraints on judicial
action. It makes possible judicial enforcement that executive violations
of the war powers clause have made necessary. The Resolution gives
substantive definition to the term "war" by defining those circum-
stances in which Congress believes its assent is required for "war" to
continue. The Resolution specifies what constitutes appropriate con-
gressional authorization of a war, and explicitly declares that appropri-
ations are not sufficient. Finally, the Resolution permits a court to
uphold the requirements of the Constitution without declaring a war
illegal or ordering troop withdrawal. Enforcement of the Resolution
only requires a court to order that a report be filed, leaving to Congress
the question of approval of the war effort.
176. The court in Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), af'd, 720 F.2d
1555 (D.C. Cir. 1983), flatly rejected the executive's broad invocations of political question:
The Court disagrees with defendants that this is the type of political question
which involves potential judicial interference with executive discretion in the for-
eign affairs field. Plaintiffs do not seek relief that would dictate foreign policy but
rather to enforce existing law concerning the procedures for decision-making.
Moreover, the issue here is not a political question simply because it involves the
apportionment of power between the executive and legislative branches. The duty
of courts to decide such questions has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Id at 898. See infra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a 'd, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
179. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
180. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1309 (1973); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.
Supp. at 702; cf Ramirez v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Congress clearly defined those military activities that require con-
gressional assent if they are to continue beyond sixty days.' 81 In doing
so it gave courts a "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dard."' 82 In sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b), Congress articulated a triggering
standard based on objective circumstances: the duration and level of
hostilities. The statute requires congressional assent where United
States Armed Forces are "introduced into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances," and where such activity continues for more than sixty
days. 183
The legislative history shows that Congress carefully defined the
standard precisely in order to avoid presidential non-compliance, and
that it expected the President to report in a broad range of circum-
stances. The original House bill required a report when the President
"(1) commits United States military forces to armed conflict." Accord-
ing to the House Report, this language contemplated the commitment
of United States Armed Forces "to situations in which hostilities al-
ready have broken out and where there is reasonable expectation that
American military personnel will be subject to hostile fire."184 The
House Report offers three examples of situations which would trigger a
report: the Cambodian invasion of 1970;185 the Dominican Republic
invasion of 1965;186 and the earliest bombing of Laos.187 The bill's pro-
ponents intended that the definition be clear so that it would be subject
to as little interpretation by the Executive as possible. 88
The subsequent substitution of the word "hostilities" for "armed
181. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
182. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217; Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042.
183. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a)(1), 1544(b) (1976).
184. H.R. REP. No. 1547, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 65.
185. In 1970, President Nixon, without congressional knowledge or consent, authorized
United States Armed Forces to invade a claimed North Vietnam sanctuary area in Cambo-
dia. Nixon asserted that the invasion was to protect United States Armed Forces in Viet-
nam. The invasion caused a major outcry in Congress. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
STUDY, supra note 55, at 26-32.
186. In 1965, without congressional knowledge or consent, President Johnson ordered
over 4,000 U.S. Armed Forces into the Dominican Republic purportedly to protect United
States citizens. Eventually 21,000 U.S. Forces were sent to the Dominican Republic. The
Administration eventually admitted that their mission was to stop the threat of a communist
takeover. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 7.
187. H.R. REP. No. 1547, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 65.
188. See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 66, citing 1970
House War Powers Hearings, at 412-14.
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conffict" was intended to ensure presidential reporting in a broader
range of circumstances:
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed
conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it
was considered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition
to a situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities
also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots
have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger
of armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities" denotes a situation
in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of
confrontation or for actual armed conflict. 89
The statute also defines what is meant by "introduction of United
States Armed Forces." This includes assignment of forces "to com-
mand, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the
regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or govern-
ment when such military forces are engaged or there exists an immi-
nent threat that such forces will become engaged in hostilities."'' 90 In
view of the careful drafting of these provisions, the standards for re-
porting pursuant to section 4(a)(1) are judicially ascertainable. 191
A second major concern for courts in the Vietnam litigation was
their inability to determine the significance to be given to various ac-
tions of Congress, such as appropriations legislation. 192 The Resolu-
tion specifically addresses this problem. Section 8(a)(1) states that no
authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
imminent hostilities is to be inferred:
from any provision of law. . . including any provision con-
tained in any appropriation act, unless such provision specifi-
cally authorizes the introduction of United States Armed
189. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEWS 2346, 2351. That Congress meant to require the President to report formally in a
broad range of situations can be seen from a colloquy between Senator Javits and Senator
Johnston. Senator Johnston asked whether the terms would include in their definition the
introduction of United States Armed Forces to guard a United States airbase in a country
where hostilities were occurring. Senator Javits answered affirmatively, stating that in such
a situation the Act would "immediately apply." 119 CONG. REc. 25,100-02 (1973).
190. War Powers Resolution, § 8(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(c) (1976).
191. As discussed earlier, the Executive has sought to narrow the congressional definition
of hostilities. For example, Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State under
President Ford, claimed that "irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particu-
lar area" does not come within the definition. War Powers Resolution, 1975.: Hearings of
Subcomra on Int'l Sec. and Scient c Affairs of the Comm. on Int'I Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) (letter of Monroe Leigh to Representative Zablocki).
192. See, e.g., Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 443
F.2d at 1042.
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Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it
is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this chapter.19
3
This provision means that congressional actions such as the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, appropriations and selective service acts are not to
be considered the equivalent of a declaration of war or congressional
assent to hostilities. The Senate Report notes that this section was in-
tended to overrule the Second Circuit Vietnam decisions that found
implicit authorization in such acts. 194 Thus, there can no longer be any
question as to which congressional actions constitute authorization of
war. 195
An underlying problem with much of the litigation challenging the
legality of the Vietnam war was the nature of the remedy. Courts were
reluctant to declare a war illegal or to order a cessation in hostilities,
even where such a result seemed to be required.'96 The procedural
mechanism established by the War Powers Resolution obviates that
concern. It permits a court to protect and implement the constitutional
scheme without declaring a war illegal and enjoining any military op-
erations. Judicial enforcement of the statute's provisions, and thus of
the war powers clause, can be effectuated by an order that the situation
requires the issuance of a report under section 4(a)(1).197 Such a ruling
193. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (1976).
194. The Senate Report reads:
The purpose of this clause is to counteract the opinion in the Orlando v. Laird
decision of the Second Circuit Court holding that passage of defense appropria-
tions bills, and extension of the Selective Service Act, could be construed as im-
plied Congressional authorization for the Vietnam War.
S. REP. No. 220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1973).
195. In § 8(a)(2) Congress ensured that treaty provisions cannot be used as a substitute
for the specific assent by Congress. This is an argument frequently relied on by the Execu-
tive. For example, in testifying about Vietnam, Secretary of State Rusk relied on the
SEATO treaty to justify the President's actions. COMMITrEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY,
supra note 55, at 12. Section 8(a)(2) states that for the treaty to constitute assent it must be
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of armed forces within
the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(2) (1976).
196. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1309 (1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488
F.2d at 615.
197. That the interposition of a statutory reporting requirement can enable judicial re-
view in an area traditionally considered non-justiciable is demonstrated by three recent
cases enforcing the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (Supp. V 1981): Banz-
hofv. Smith, No. 83-3161 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 29, 1984); Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 148
(N.D. Cal. 1983); Nathan v. Attorney General, 557 F. Supp. 1188 (D.D.C. 1983). The Ethics
in Government Act requires the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation
and report its results to a special division of the District of Columbia Circuit whenever he
receives credible and specific information that a high-level executive official has committed
a crime. By constructing a reporting requirement, the statute enables judicial review of deci-
sions traditionally considered within the judicially untouchable realm of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. See, e.g., Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. at 1498-99 (distinguishing prosecutorial
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would not be a determination that the war is illegal, but only that af-
firmative congressional action is required.' If Congress then chose to
authorize the hostilities, they could do so. Congress, and not the Court,
would determine whether United States military activity should
continue. 199
Thus, the War Powers Resolution specifically addresses the "polit-
ical question" concerns that induced courts to dismiss challenges to the
Vietnam War. It clarifies the meaning of war and congressional au-
thorization, and provides an appropriate avenue for judicial action.
The Resolution places Congress on record as opposed to presidential
assertions of broad unilateral war-making activity, and insists on Con-
gress' unwillingness to allow unilateral presidential usurpation to alter
the constitutional scheme. It is a recognition of responsibility and an
affirmation of the Constitution.
C. The Effect of JudicialAbdication
If the judiciary maintains its reluctance to enforce the war powers
clause in the face of a congressional statute that makes enforcement
possible, and presidential action that makes it necessary, the constitu-
discretion cases); cf Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 875-76 n.9 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
Just as the courts can enforce the Ethics in Government Act, and so ensure that the
criminal laws are applied equally to executive officials without requiring a full-fledged pros-
ecution, so too the courts can enforce the War Powers Resolution and ensure that executive
officials do not rise above constitutional constraints without ordering troop withdrawl. In
both instances, Congress has made judicial participation possible in areas where untram-
meled executive discretion is particularly dangerous.
198. A court order that a § 4(a)(1) report must be filed requires a determination that
United States troops have been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. If the
President urges in his defense that his actions were taken within his authority to repel sud-
den attack or to protect United States citizens, the court must further determine whether in
fact the Constitution grants the President sole authority. The express language of the Con-
stitution, the Framers' general understanding that collaborative decisionmaking is prefera-
ble to unilateral action, and the Resolution itself create a strong presumption against
unilateral military adts. Termination does not take place until 60 days after a report is re-
quired to be fied; it is exceedingly unlikely that any hostilities beyond a full-scale attack on
the nation that continues for over 60 days are within unilateral executive authority. Requir-
ing a § 4(a)(1) report induces collaboration and guarantees that Congress can exercise its
war powers with full effect.
199. While in the first instance a court might for prudential reasons require that only a
report be filed, the statutory scheme indicates that withdrawal of troops could be ordered as
well. As discussed earlier, the 60-day automatic termination provision is triggered whether a
report is fied or not; it is the objective circumstances of troop involvement that starts the
running of the 60-day period. For example, where involvement in hostilities had clearly
lasted more than 60 days, a court could order withdrawal. See Tribe, The Legislative Veto
Decision: A Law By Any Other Name, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 20 n.95 (1984), discussed
infra at note 217.
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tional crisis in war powers will continue unaltered. Any court that in-
tends to dismiss a War Powers Resolution case on political question
grounds must therefore squarely confront the effect of such a
dismissal.2"°
All that is required to resolve this constitutional crisis and reaffirm
the Framers' intent is a court order that the President file a section
4(a)(1) report. A refusal to so order will render Congress' hard-fought
statute essentially meaningless. Without judicial recognition that a sec-
tion 4(a)(1) report is required by the objective circumstances of hostili-
ties or imminent hostilities, the termination provision can only be
triggered by Congressional action.201 Judicial abdication would require
Congress to go forward and pass a statute, probably over a veto, to
declare that another statute-the War Powers Resolution-should be
followed. Congress has already been forced by judicial abdication to
pass a statute to implement the Constitution. Further abdication raises
the possibility of a never-ending series of statutes to implement statutes
to implement statutes, all requiring a two-thirds vote of Congress, and
all as unenforceable as the Constitutional provision that they seek to
implement.
A refusal to order that the Resolution is triggered will effectively
write the automatic termination provision out of the statute. The pur-
pose of that provision-the heart of the statute-was to ensure that
Congress would no longer be forced to go forward and act affirmatively
to stop an unauthorized war.2°2 The automatic termination provision
redresses the constitutional imbalance by ensuring that absent congres-
sional action, United States involvement in hostilities cannot continue
beyond sixty, or at most, ninety days. It was understood by all con-
cerned that automatic termination meant that congressional inaction
could halt a war. Numerous attempts were made to amend the statute
to require affirmative congressional disapproval before termination
would be effected; all such attempts failed.2"3 President Nixon vetoed
200. Political question dismissals, as traditionally understood, are particularly dangerous.
Unlike standing, ripeness or mootness, a determination that a case presents a non-justiciable
political question is not limited to the particular posture of a particular plaintiff and case,
but rather applies broadly to the entire issue. To refuse to decide on political question
grounds is therefore to erase an entire issue from the slate of judicially controllable action.
E. KEYNEs, supra note 2, at 68; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question:- A Func-
ionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 537-38 (1966).
201. It is evident that even in the clearest circumstances Presidents are unwilling to file a
§ 4(a)(1) report. See supra notes 110-59 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 103.
203. Both the House and Senate versions of the War Powers Resolution had automatic
termination provisions. See H.R.L Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 24,708
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the statute in large part because of his objection to this aspect of the
bill; his veto was overridden.2 4 The termination provision is critical to
the resurrection of Congress' constitutional war power. As Representa-
tive Bingham remarked: "The Constitution does not say the Congress
shall vote yes or no on a declaration of war. What happens if the Con-
gress does nothing? Then there is no declaration of war, so that is ac-
tion by inaction, if you will, right in the Constitution. '20 5 If the courts
(1973); S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 25,119-20 (1973). When H.R.J. Res.
542 went to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Nixon Administration submitted a
memorandum particularly focusing on the automatic cut-off. It claimed that the provision
could generate pressure for escalation in order to achieve objectives within 120 days and that
it would infringe on the President's constitutional power to repel sudden attacks. COMMIT-
TEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 125. Several Committee members ar-
gued that Congress should not be permitted to stop the President by inaction; their motion to
strike the provision was defeated 25 to 7. Id at 125-26.
When the House Bill came to the floor the cut-off was again the primary focus. Minor-
ity Leader Gerald Ford read into the record a telegram from President Nixon stating that he
would veto any bill containing an automatic termination provision. 119 CONG. REc. 24,663
(1973). Representative Whalen offered an amendment requiring Congress to pass a resolu-
tion disapproving military action before termination could take effect. Representative
Zablocki, opposing the hange, stressed the importance of the automatic cut-off, pointing
out that to require disapproval of Congress would thwart the will of the majority: such a bill
could be vetoed and one-third of either House could prevent an override. Id at 24,689.
Congressman Bingham said the Whalen amendment went to the "heart" of the House Bill.
The Whalen amendment was defeated and the automatic cut-off remained in the legislation.
204. President Nixon, after repeated attempts to delete the automatic termination provi-
sion before the bill's passage and while in conference, ultimately vetoed the War Powers
Resolution, in large part because of the automatic termination provision. See COMMITrEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS STUDY, supra note 55, at 143-44, 156-67. The Veto Message reads, in
part:
One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty
days unless Congress extended them. . . .I am particularly disturbed by the fact
that certain of the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces would terminate automatically under this resolution 60 days after
they were invoked. No overt Congressional action would be required to cut off
these powers--they would disappear automatically unless the Congress extended
them. In effect, the Congress is here attempting to increase its policy-making role
through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no action at all.
Veto Message concerning H.R.J. Res. 542, reprinted in 119 CONo. Rnc. 34,991 (1973). See
also Spong, supra note 90, at 835-36. President Nixon's veto was overridden on November
7, 1973. 119 CONG. REC. 36,202, 36,220 (1973).
205. 119 CONG. REc. 24,662 (1973). Other remarks demonstrated the central significance
of the automatic termination provision. Representative Dupont noted that, "if nothing hap-
pens, the military action stops. . . under the Constitution the presumption ought to be in
favor of the Congress and not the executive." 119 CONG. REC. 24,690 (1973). Representative
Findley commented that:
One would almost assume. . . from hearing the discussion during the last
couple of hours that inaction on the part of the Congress is a very novel and
strange way that the Congress has to prevent unwise policy. Exactly the opposite is
the case.
Inaction has been the traditional way by which the Congress has rejected un-
wise policy, not only in the foreign field, but in the domestic field as well.
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refuse to give the automatic termination provision the force of law, ju-
dicial "restraint" will have resurrected not the Constitution, but Repre-
sentative Whalen's defeated amendment and President Nixon's
overridden veto. In such a situation, "restraint" can only be termed
"abdication."
VII. CROCKETT v. RFAGAN-A CASE STUDY
The only case to date seeking judicial enforcement of the War
Powers Resolution is Crockett v. Reagan." Congressman George
Crockett and twenty-eight fellow members of Congress challenged
President Reagan's failure to comply with the War Powers Resolution's
reporting and termination requirements regarding United States mili-
tary involvement in El Salvador. They claimed that the dispatch of
fifty-six military advisors to El Salvador constituted an introduction of
Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, thereby triggering
the Resolution's cut-off mechanism. Plaintiffs alleged that the advisors
had suffered casualties, worked in combat areas, had been subject to at
least two direct attacks, fought side by side with government troops,
and were drawing "hostile fire pay."2" 7 They sought, inter alia, a de-
claratory judgment that the Resolution's sixty-day cut-off provision
had been triggered, and/or injunctive relief directing that the United
States Armed Forces be withdrawn from El Salvador.2 °8
The district court dismissed the case on the ground that the fact
finding necessary to determine whether a section 4(a)(1) report was re-
quired to be filed would be too difficult.2°9 In doing so, the court care-
fully restricted its holding of non-justiciability to the particular facts
posed by the case "in its present posture". 210 The court rejected defend-
Id
206. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), a'dper curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
petition for cert. pending.
207. 558 F. Supp. at 897. For details of these and other instances of involvement in hos-
tilities, see supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. Defendants submitted a declaration
denying these claims, urging that the "sole function of training Salvadoran military person-
nel [was] to create a self-training capability. . . ." 558 F. Supp. at 897.
208. Plaintiffs also alleged violation of § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976)), which prohibits the provision of security assistance to "'any
country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights."' These claims were dismissed on equitable discretion
grounds. 558 F. Supp. at 902 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2)).
209. 558 F. Supp. at 898. The circuit court's per curiam affirmance, reminiscent in its
brevity of Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967),
adds nothing to a consideration of the issue; this section will concentrate on the district court
decision.
210. 558 F. Supp. at 896.
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ants' broad claim that the case raised a political question simply be-
cause it might interfere with executive discretion in foreign affairs. The
Resolution obviated this concern; "plaintiffs do not seek relief that
would dictate foreign policy but rather to enforce existing law concern-
ing the procedures for decision-making".21' Similarly, the court was
careful-unlike many of the Vietnam War courts2 12 --to insist that
"[tihe duty of courts to decide such questions [of the apportionment of
power between the executive and legislative branches] has been repeat-
edly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court". 213 Thus, the court refused to
dismiss the case on defendants' broad political question grounds.21 4
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the case as a political question
on a narrower ground. It determined that whether the situation in El
211. Id at 898 (emphasis added).
212. See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d at 665-66; Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. at
704-05; Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846, 852 (D. Kan. 1968), af'd sub nom. Velvel v.
Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970). In each of these
cases, the court treated the textual commitment standard of the political question doctrine
loosely, looking only to see if the decision was committed to "the political branches." The
question, however, is whether the decision is committed to a particular coordinate branch.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Since each of the above courts found no dis-
pute between Congress and the President, they presumably need not have gone beyond the
question of commitment to "the political branches," but such a framing of the political ques-
tion doctrine suggests that even where the branches are in conflict, the judiciary will abstain.
In any case, the War Powers Resolution itself creates a presumption of conflict between the
branches whenever troops are introduced into hostilities without the required § 4(a)(1) re-
port. More generally, the Resolution indicates a conflict between the President and Con-
gress as to which particular branch has the authority to commence war-like activities. See
supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
213. 558 F. Supp. at 898.
214. In Crockett v. Reagan, defendants also argued that plaintiffs lacked standing, that
the case should be dismissed in the exercise of the court's equitable discretion,and that plain-
tiffs had no private right of action. Neither the district court nor the per curiam affirmance
of the court of appeals addresses these issues.
At least two classes of plaintiffs appear to have standing to litigate War Powers Resolu-
tion claims. Members of Congress have standing under the District of Columbia Circuit
decision in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Where Congress' role in
government is diminished by unlawful executive action, or where a particular vote is nulli-
fied, individual Congressmen have standing. Id. at 436-36; see also Riegle v. Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC), 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1882 (1981).
Members of the military who refuse an order to fight in hostilities undertaken in violation of
the War Powers Resolution may also be able to raise the claim in federal courts. See, e.g.,
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom Orlando v. Laird, 404 U.S.
869 (1971).
The doctrine of equitable discretion mandates dismissal of congressional claims where
members have an effective in-House remedy for their alleged injuries. Riegle v. FOMC, 656
F.2d at 879. Riegle should not be read to mean that members of Congress have an "in-
House" remedy because Congress can pass another resolution informing the Executive that,
when it adopted the statute in the first place, it really meant it. Moreover, passage of an-
other statute could not remedy the congressional injury which arises from the executive
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Salvador in 1982 involved hostilities or imminent hostilities would re-
quire resolution of disputed questions of fact beyond judicial compe-
tence. In essence, it found the case too close to call, and, relying in part
on the fact that Congress had taken no action on the question, refused
to adjudicate it.z15  The court insisted that where the facts were less
elusive, a court could and should trigger the Resolution's cut-off provi-
sion. It distinguished between Vietnam, where "it would be absurd for
[a court] to decline to find that United States forces had been intro-
duced into hostilities," and El Salvador, where "a small number of
American military personnel . . apparently have suffered no
casualities." 16
The court went on to find that the appropriate judicial response
under a War Powers Resolution claim where no report had been filed
alteration of the constitutional scheme. Congress would still bear the burden of affirma-
tively stopping hostilities.
Lastly, Congress and members of the military clearly have a private right of action
under the Constitution. Cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979).
It would not make sense that a right of action existing under a clause of the Constitu-
tion can be exterminated by a statute passed to clarify and implement that clause, unless
such statute either provides an effective alternative remedy or specifically abolishes such
right of action. The War Powers Resolution does neither. Moreover, the language and leg-
islative history of the Resolution establish that under the elements set forth in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), there exists a private right of action for members of Congress to
enforce the statute. Congressional plaintiffs are members of the class for whose special bene-
fit the Resolution was enacted. The statute expressly identifies Congress as the class Con-
gress intended to benefit. For example, § 1541 is intended to assure that Congress will
exercise collective judgment with the President on the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities. The War Powers Resolution thus evinces an "unmistakable focus"
on the rights of Congress. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979).
215. 558 F. Supp. at 898-99. The court observed that some cases would be justiciable.
"[W]ere Congress to pass a resolution to the effect that a report was required under the
WPR, or to the effect that the forces should be withdrawn, and the President disregarded it,
a constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be presented." Id. at 899.
But this leaves a non-justiciable gap almost as wide as existed prior to the War Powers
Resolution, and frustrates the central purpose-"to prevent another situation in which a
President 6ould gradually build up American involvement in a foreign war without congres-
sional knowledge or approval, eventually presenting Congress with a full-blown undeclared
war which on a practical level it was powerless to stop." Id To restrict justiciability to such
an "impasse" would be to require Congress to do what was "politically impossible to do"
during Vietnam, and to frustrate the constitutional scheme.
216. Id at 898-99. The court's focus on the difficulty of fact-finding was premature.
When considering justiciability on a motion to dismiss, the court is to accept plaintiffs well-
pleaded facts as true, so as not to decide the merits at the jurisdictional threshold. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1942). The court in Crockett relied on a counter-affidavit going
to the merits in concluding that it should not reach the merits. At minimum, an in camera
hearing on justiciability should have been afforded. See, e.g., Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems
Tech. Ass'n, 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). In any case, courts have frequently de-
cided cases with facts as elusive as Crockett. See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
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would be to require the filing of a report. Even where the level of hos-
tilities had been such as to require a report sixty or more days prior to
decision, the court insisted that it would not order withdrawal of
United States forces.2 17 However, the court also rejected defendants'
argument that if the President chooses to disregard the triggering re-
quirement, Congress must affirmatively act to require a report. Leav-
ing the burden to Congress would frustrate the Resolution's purpose,
by imposing on Congress the same unconstitutional burden to go for-
ward and expressly disapprove presidential action that it had faced
before passage of the Resolution. In appropriate circumstances there-
fore, a court could require a report, thus triggering the cut-off provision
but leaving Congress its full sixty (or ninety) days to consider the mat-
Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1974).
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to dismiss a case solely on the
ground that fact-finding would involve "sensitive" military matters:
As to the problem of "sensitive and confidential communications between the
highest members of the Executive branch and officials of a foreign power": On the
basis of a bare complaint, a motion to dismiss and related affidavits, we cannot say
the resolution of this question will require discovery of such materials. . . . If and
when Executive privilege is asserted and it develops that essential evidence is
therefore undiscoverable, there will be time enough to dismiss. See Halkin v.
Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(prior disposition of connected case).
Ramirez v. Weinberger, No. 83-1950, slip op. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 1983) (available on
LEXIS, GenFed library, Cases file).
217. The Court found that:
the legislative scheme did not contemplate court-ordered withdrawal when no re-
port has been filed, but rather, it leaves open the possibility for a court to order that
a report be filed or, alternatively, withdrawal 60 days after a report was filed or
required to be filed by a court or Congress.
558 F. Supp. at 901 (emphasis added).
The court's finding that the automatic termination provision of the War Powers Resolu-
tion does not operate unless the President has filed a report or been required to file a report
by a court or Congress appears incorrect. The plain language of 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) man-
dates that within sixty days after a report is "submitted or is required to be submitted. . . the
President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such
report was submitted (or required to be submitted) . . . (emphasis added). The legislative
history shows that the report is required by objective circumstances. See supra notes 97-109
and accompanying text.
The court's reading could also raise constitutional problems under the Chadha decision.
As stated by Professor Tribe:
It follows from Chadha, however-as well as from the purpose of§ 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution-that such reporting requirements and durational limits must
be triggered by the objective presence of events such as "hostilities"-events whose
presence or absence a court can itself ascertain-and not by a one-House or even
two-House "resolution" that such events have indeed occurred. The contrary read-
ing of § 5(b) in Crockett v. Reagan. . . is thus manifestly untenable after Chadha.
Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: 4 Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,
20 n.20 (1984).
SYMPOSIUM
ter.218 To order "the mere filing of a report cannot thwart congres-
sional will, but can only supply information to aid congressional
decisionmaking." 19
Crockett v. Reagan represents the only court ruling to date on the
enforceability of the War Powers Resolution. Although problematic in
its premature dismissal of the merits, the court's holding that "the pro-
cedures for decision-making" set out in the Resolution can be judicially
enforced is an important first step in effectuating the purpose of the
Resolution. Its language suggests that the judiciary has a role in giving
the Resolution the force of law. On the other hand, the court's reluc-
tance to find the facts, based in part on the finding that Congress had
taken no action to require the filing of a report, is unfortunate. The
statute's legislative history establishes that Congress specifically in-
tended its inaction to have operational effect. As Professor Tribe
pointed out, commenting on such sunset provisions: "Once authority
has been delegated in this special way, such inaction by Congress func-
tions not as a 'sign' of unenacted 'intent,' but rather as an operative fact
giving final effect to an otherwise incomplete exercise of delegated
power."
220
The Crockett court's treatment recalls many of the later Vietnam
War cases, in which courts were willing to recognize, in the abstract,
the duty to decide, but refused to take the final step required for mean-
ingful judicial action in each particular instance.221 The question that
remains open for future courts is whether the Crockett court's reason-
ing will be followed and applied, or whether its improvident and pre-
mature dismissal will be expanded. If the latter route is taken, the War
Powers Resolution will be rendered as ineffectual as the war powers
clause in assuring that Congress retains its power to decide on the initi-
ation of war.
VIII. CONCLUSION
War-making in the United States has come increasingly under the
218. 558 F. Supp. at 901.
219. Id The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision per curiam
with no further elaboration of its reasoning. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Judge Bork
concurred in the result, finding that the members of Congress lacked standing because they
had failed to allege a disenfranchisement. Id at 1357. Judge Bork admits that his reasoning
contradicts District of Columbia Circuit precedent. His opinion also fails to carefully con-
sider the nature of the injury suffered by members of Congress when their power to declare
war is negated by unilateral presidential action. See supra note 214.
220. Tribe, supra note 108, at 529.
221. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
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unilateral de facto power of the President. The gap between the Fram-
ers' intent and presidential practice has grown exponentially since the
beginning of the twentieth century. By the Vietnam era, the gap had
reached crisis proportions, as the longest undeclared war in our history
brought unprecedented public protest. Nonetheless, Congress, the
most representative body, found it politically impossible to challenge
presidential usurpation of its war power. Litigants regularly turned to
the courts, but the courts just as regularly turned them away, invoking
the cloak of "political question" nonjusticiability to avoid clear viola-
tions of unconstitutional authority.
The War Powers Resolution arose as a reaction to the constitu-
tional crisis made manifest in the Vietnam War. It marks Congress'
attempt to reestablish its constitutional authority. To date, it has failed,
as presidents have regularly avoided its dictates through narrow legal-
isms and broad assertions of prerogative. If the Resolution is to fulfill
the intentions of Congress and the Framers, it must be given the force
of law.
It is the duty of the judiciary to enforce the laws. The courts re-
fused to perform that duty under the war powers clause, and contrib-
uted to a constitutional crisis. The War Powers Resolution vitiates the
"political question" concerns articulated by the Vietnam era courts.
The Resolution makes judicial enforcement of war powers possible; ex-
ecutive intransigence makes it necessary. Congress has provided the
means for resolution of a crisis; only the courts can give those means
effect.
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